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Abstract
The present dissertation evaluates specific labour market policies and investi­
gates individual saving behaviour in economies characterized by search and match­
ing frictions in the labour market.
The first chapter investigates the optimality of state provided unemployment 
insurance in a search theoretic framework with saving and borrowing constraints. 
The model is solved numerically, since an analytic solution is not possible, and 
then calibrated using features of the US economy. The results demonstrate that 
when individuals have access to saving, the importance of unemployment benefits 
provision diminishes significantly. Ex post heterogeneity among agents, matters 
however. Individuals that were unlucky not to accumulate enough assets to buffer 
the unemployment risk, would still prefer to receive non-trivial amounts of state 
provided benefits during their unemployment spell.
The second chapter of the thesis is concerned with the interaction between sav­
ing, consumption and search. It starts by documenting that the excess sensitivity of 
consumption growth to lagged labor income growth conceals a negative sensitivity 
of consumption growth to lagged unemployment growth. To understand this em­
pirical regularity, we embed search frictions in a heterogeneous agent, precaution­
ary savings model and study the implications for unemployment and consumption 
dynamics both at the microeconomic and macroeconomic level.
The third and final chapter employs a standard search and matching model 
with no saving, in order to study the effects of firing taxes on the job destruction
2
rate, when probation period -  or temporary contract - policies axe implemented. 
It is shown that, contrary to conventional wisdom, firing taxes can amplify the job 
turnover rate by providing incentives to destroy surviving matches at the end of 
the probation period. Moreover, low skill workers are shown to be more severely 
affected while wage inequality across different productivity groups may increase.
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Introduction
The present thesis is built upon a particular approach to the theory of un­
employment. More specifically, it employs the search theory of unemployment in 
an attempt to examine certain features of labour market policy on one hand and 
saving behaviour at the individual as well as the aggregate level on the other.
The approach of search frictions in the labour market has been greatly sup­
ported in the past years by the emergence of new data on job and worker flows 
and has also proved popular in examining equilibrium unemployment and unem­
ployment dynamics. More importantly, because the notion of risk is manifested 
not only through the danger of exiting the employment state but also through the 
risk of remaining unemployed for certain periods of time, this approach constitutes 
a solid theoretical foundation for the study of policy associated with the welfare 
state (like the provision of unemployment insurance for example) as well as the 
analysis of instruments that guard against the risk of income loss (like individual 
saving).
The first chapter of the thesis is concerned with determining the optimal level of 
unemployment insurance provision in a model where consumers exit the unemploy­
ment pool at a predetermined rate while their chances of becoming re-employed 
at some subsequent period are affected by their individual choice of search ef­
fort on one hand and the aggregate-wide matching frictions on the other. At the 
same time, these consumers are allowed to accumulate assets in order to buffer the
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risk associated with income and thus consumption loss in some future state (pre­
cautionary saving). The latter is an important feature of this economy because 
it immediately raises the issue of the substitutability between private and pub­
lic provision. Similar scenarios have been studied by Fredriksson and Holmlund 
(2001), Costain (1999) and Lentz (2005), but the present work takes a step further 
by introducing the notion of endogenous search decision, an endogenous aggregate 
matching rate and a wage determination process that depends explicitly on the 
workers’ outside option. In addition, heterogeneity among agents in the current 
thesis is generated not only through different employment/unemployment histo­
ries but also through labour income fluctuations which - despite their simplistic 
modelling - may amplify the individual wealth differences of ex-ante identical con­
sumers and can have an impact on the design of optimal unemployment insurance 
provision. The results of the analysis suggest that individual saving is a powerful 
weapon that can used very effectively against the unemployment risk and there­
fore the need for additional state provided assistance diminishes significantly when 
the welfare metric is aggregate welfare. However, it is shown that heterogeneity 
does matter because consumers who have been unlucky and unable to accumulate 
assets would prefer to receive non-trivial levels of unemployment insurance and 
enjoy considerable gains to their individual consumption profile.
The second chapter documents a stylized fact between lagged unemployment 
growth rate and current non-durables aggregate consumption growth, namely that 
the latter is negatively related to the former over and above the excess sensitivity of
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consumption growth to income growth. To explain this correlation - and in general 
to understand the individual and aggregate implications - this chapter utilizes the 
framework of the previous one, i.e. a model that embeds search frictions in the pre­
cautionary saving literature. This investigation suggests that when households can 
distinguish aggregate from idiosyncratic job destruction shocks (complete informa­
tion), the model cannot replicate the macroeconomic stylized facts, even though it 
does better than the model without any search. However, the introduction of in­
complete information improves these predictions moving the model’s results closer 
in line with the empirical evidence, mainly because the signal extraction problem 
does not allow the complete smoothing of unemployment shocks.
The last chapter of the thesis abstracts from saving and search decisions and 
takes a much simpler approach to the relationship between probation period poli­
cies and firing taxes. More specifically, the model argues that firing tax regulations 
are not always beneficial for job destruction when accompanied by probation (or 
temporary contract) periods. This is because these tax-free periods provide incen­
tives to firms to dispose off employees before the firing tax policy is initiated, thus 
amplifying the destruction rate and increasing unemployment. It is also shown, 
that lower productivity workers may suffer more when compared with more pro­
ductive peers, as a result of the implementation of such policies.
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CHAPTER 1
Optimal unem ploym ent insurance w ith search, saving and 
liquidity constraints
1.1. Introduction
The present chapter examines the optimality of unemployment insurance (UI 
henceforth) provision in a model where impatient but prudent and borrowing con­
strained individuals have access to savings, choose their search intensity during the 
unemployment spell and receive labour income when employed. In this framework, 
the aggregate matching rate1 is determined endogenously while the wage formation 
is structured in a way that it depends explicitly on the workers’ wealth accumu­
lation and their outside opportunity. The results of this research suggest that the 
presence of savings diminishes the importance UI provision and that the welfare 
gains of eliminating any state provided assistance can be non trivial. Although 
this may be true from an aggregate perspective, heterogeneity between individ­
uals does matter. Agents who were unlucky enough to accumulate very limited 
amounts of savings are still better off when receiving UI at historically observed
Tn the standard search and matching framework, the aggregate matching rate is determined by 
the availability of vacancies and unemployed individulas. It is assumed to affect positively the 
individual transition probabilities from the unemployment to the employment state.
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levels. As a result, both the optimal net replacement rate (N R R 2) and the accom­
panied welfare benefits are a decreasing function of the buffer stock of savings of 
individuals.
As a starting point, the adverse effect of UI on search decisions and the aggre­
gate matching rate is an important ingredient. Unemployment insurance reduces 
search incentives (the moral hazard effect) and consequently increases unemploy­
ment, something which decreases the aggregate matching rate. The latter reduces 
further the individual job finding probability and demonstrates that the optimality 
of UI provision cannot be fully evaluated in partial equilibrium models with a fixed 
matching rate coefficient. Access to savings together with the wage determination 
process are the other crucial components. When agents cannot save, equilibrium 
labour income is increasing in UI because of the improvement in the " threat" 
point of individuals at higher unemployment benefits. Because the equilibrium 
wage increases as the state assistance becomes more generous, some of the adverse 
effects of UI are partly offset, which in turn entails that some insurance may be 
welfare improving. However, when saving is an option and the wage agreement 
depends explicitly on the agents’ stock of wealth, two new things emerge: Firstly, 
the equilibrium wage is higher than before, and secondly, it remains relatively flat 
across all levels of unemployment insurance. The first result is due to the fact that 
workers and searchers have - on average - improved their outside option value by
2The net replacement rate is the ratio of the after tax unemployment benefit over the after tax 
labour income received when employed expressed in percentage terms. Note that in this chapter 
the terms "ratio" and "rate" will be used interchangably.
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having accumulated assets. To understand the second feature of the model one 
has to recall that impatient consumers will reduce their savings whenever faced 
with lower risk. Although a more generous UI provision tends to improve individ­
uals’ threat point, the reduction in accumulated assets, that follows the increase 
in benefits, acts towards the opposite direction. It turns out that the combined 
effect is negligible and hence the wage is very inelastic to unemployment insurance 
provision. Overall, agents enjoy a higher wage income than before (even at zero 
UI) and on average they have enough savings to buffer the unemployment risk. 
At the same time, a zero net replacement rate implies that the government does 
not distort search incentives at all (i.e. there is no moral hazard) and therefore 
the unemployment rate is kept to a minimum. However, a zero UI may not be the 
optimal policy for individuals with very few assets, a result that raises the issue 
of a non-uniform UI provision, even for an economy that is populated by ex ante 
identical consumers.
All in all, the model incorporates the basic ingredients of the precautionary sav­
ings literature pioneered by the seminal works of Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991) and 
Carroll (1992, 1997) to the search theoretical framework of Mortensen (1978) and 
Pissarides (1984, 1985 and 2000) that has been widely used to explain equilibrium 
unemployment and unemployment dynamics. Indeed, such a unified framework 
seems appropriate for the study of UI mainly because of the interaction between 
savings and search effort. In the standard buffer stock saving literature, households 
accumulate assets in order to help buffer negative shocks to income [Deaton (1991)
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and Carroll (1992, 1997)]. On the other hand, models that embed variable search 
effort explore endogenous search decisions by associating the search intensity with 
the probability of exiting the unemployment state [a few examples include Hopen- 
hayn and Nicolini (1997), Costain (1999) and Lentz (2005)]. It becomes therefore 
evident that savings and search are two instruments that guard against the unem­
ployment risk and because they are both costly for an impatient agent there can 
be a potential interaction between them. More specifically, the extent to which an 
agent has access to savings as an instrument of self insurance will affect the extent 
to which she can finance her consumption during the unemployment spell. The 
latter will be reflected in the intensity of search and the demand for additional 
insurance in the form of state provided benefits.
Research on this area was first pioneered by the work of Hansen and Imro- 
horoglu (1992). They studied the optimality of UI in a model where agents have 
access to a storage technology (with zero interest rate) and can either accept or 
reject exogenous employment opportunities. Hence, their approach abstracts from 
search decisions but moral hazard is modelled by assigning positive probabilities 
of receiving UI benefit to those agents that reject employment opportunities. In 
general, they find that positive levels of the unemployment benefit are optimal, as 
long as the degree of moral hazard is not extreme. Along these lines, Joseph and 
Weitzenblum (2003) employ a partial equilibrium model with search and savings 
to examine the UI provision and its beneficial role for low paid workers in France. 
They find that once agents are allowed to accumulate assets then the replacement
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rate should be set close to 30 percent. Somewhat similar results are obtained by- 
Wang and Williamson (1996). Finally, Lentz (2005) uses a partial equilibrium job 
search model with savings for the Danish economy and estimates that the optimal 
N R R  lies in the range of 43 to 82 percent depending on the relationship between 
the discount rate and the interest rate. Costain (1999) takes a step further by using 
a general equilibrium framework. However, because his wage is a weighted average 
of the marginal product of labour and the disutility from work, labour income de­
termination is independent of the outside opportunities of a worker [a point made 
also by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001)]. Since his calibration is based on a 
quarterly frequency and benefits are assumed to be paid for six months, the moral 
hazard effect is not strong. Thus, Costain finds that the optimal replacement rate 
for patient agents is close to 50 percent and quite higher for impatient individuals.
The present model is similar to the models analysed by Costain (1999) and 
Lentz (2005) in that savings are considered a costly means of self insurance against 
the unemployment risk. My divergence from Lentz however, is that the aggregate 
matching rate is not taken as given and that labour income is determined endoge­
nously. In contrast with Costain on the other hand, the wage determination that 
I employ is made explicitly dependant on the outside opportunities of workers and
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searchers. In addition, my calibration is made over a monthly frequency while I al­
low for a fixed level of unemployment benefit to be paid indefinitely3, assumptions 
that may impact on the degree of moral hazard manifested in the model.
More specifically, I embed variable search intensity in the precautionary savings 
model with borrowing constraints. Like in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), David­
son and Woodbury (1998), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), Costain (1999) and 
Lentz (2005) the effort exerted to find a job during the unemployment spell4 is 
unobservable by any third party and thus is a source of moral hazard. In addition, 
I model explicitly the dependence of labour income on the workers’ resources by 
resolving to wage posting similar in spirit to Moen (1997) and Pissarides (2001). 
Impatient and prudent consumers face idiosyncratic labour income uncertainty and 
the exogenous risk of becoming unemployed in which case they will receive a state 
provided unemployment assistance. As a result, those individuals that can afford 
to, choose to save in order to finance consumption in bad periods. At the same 
time, firms post vacancies at a given cost and wait for the arrival of workers.
The model is solved numerically since an analytical solution is not possible 
and then calibrated to match certain relevant features of monthly US data. For 
the benchmark scenario, access to savings dramatically diminishes the role of UI 
provision when aggregate welfare is the welfare metric. Because US unemployment
3It is true that the current US system provides unemployment benefits during the first 6 months 
of the unemployment spell. However, there axe other forms of assistance (e.g. housing benefits) 
that can be extended for a period of 60 months.
4In this model, on the job search is discarded.
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duration is usually short, individuals can buffer it effectively by accumulating rela­
tively few amounts of assets. Very poor individuals however, still prefer to receive 
non-trivial levels of state provided assistance in order to finance consumption dur­
ing the unemployment spell.
In contrast with most of the existing literature, I show that a higher degree of 
risk aversion is not necessarily associated with stronger demand for unemployment 
insurance. The result follows because more risk averse individuals accumulate on 
average more assets and are thus more able to buffer the unemployment risk. On 
top of that, the endogeneity of the matching rate is important since a declining 
rate - at higher UI levels - has a more negative impact the welfare of more risk 
averse individuals.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section outlines the model. It 
begins with the household problem and then proceeds to discuss the firm side of 
the economy, the transition rates, and the description of the search equilibrium. 
Section 3 presents the benchmark results while section 4 is devoted to risk aversion. 
Section 5 discusses the implications of ex post heterogeneity and section 6  concludes 
the chapter.
1.2. The Model
1.2.1. Households
I consider the problem of an infinitely lived household j  that maximizes expected 
intertemporal utility and faces two types of risk: The first one takes the form
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of idiosyncratic labour income fluctuations and the second one is driven by the 
positive probability of job loss in some subsequent period. The former is imple­
mented in order to generate a higher degree of heterogeneity among agents. When 
employed, the individual receives a wage and when unemployed she receives an 
unemployment benefit which is assumed to be strictly less than her labour income. 
Therefore, the individual needs to decide how much to consume and save in pe­
riods of employment and how much to consume, save and search in periods of 
unemployment.
In the present work, normative aspects of unemployment insurance such as 
duration and eligibility are not considered. In addition, I do not investigate the 
possibility of quitters. In effect, I am ignoring the case in which benefits are not 
being paid to those who do not search at all but, as it turns out in the simulations, 
no agent chooses to optimally set her search effort equal to zero.
Formally:
oo
(1.1) E0J 2 ^ m o jt) - r , jtG(sjt)\max
subject to
(1.2) Cjt T  bjt ^  ^jt
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(1.3) xjt+i =  (1 +  r)bjt + (1 -  Vjt+iK1 -  r t+i)wjt+iCjt+i + Vjt+ii1 -  Tt+i)z
(1.4) cjt > 0
(1.5) bjt > 0
(1 .6 ) sjt > 0
(1.7) Pr(»?j( II h-
1
«*+. 1 1—* II o
(1.8) Pr(^t =  Olfy-t.! =  0)
(1.9) Pr(% =  0|%-1 =  1)
(1.10) Pr(% =  % t- l  =  1)
All variables are in real terms. bjt is the real amount of the riskless asset (bonds) 
held between the beginning of period t and the beginning of period t +  1 while j3 
is the discount factor that satisfies 0  < j3 < 1 . U(cjt) is a function that describes 
the felicity derived from consumption (Cjt) and is assumed to be strictly increasing 
and concave. G(sjt) stands for the disutility of search (sjt) in period t, with G(-) 
being increasing and convex. As such, preferences apart from being additively
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separable over time, they axe also separable over consumption and search. This 
implies that search costs Eire independent of consumption and thus wealth [for 
an elaborate discussion on the issue of non-separability and its consequences for 
the search profile see Lentz and Tranaes (2002)]. Xjt denotes cash on hand at the 
beginning of period t [(1 .2 ) will hold with strict equality given local non-satiation], 
r is the net riskless rate on savings which is assumed time-invariant and exogenous, 
Wjt is wage income received at the beginning of period t while r t is the marginal 
tax rate, common to all individuals, z is the state provided unemployment benefit 
which is assumed to be strictly less than wage income. 77^  € {0 , 1 } denotes the 
state of employment at time t , where 77 =  1 stands for unemployed and 77 =  0  for 
employed. €jt + 1 is an i.i.d. shock with mean 1 and s.d. cre5. The latter, together 
with the probability of job loss are the two sources of uncertainty. Finally, S is the 
exogenous probability of becoming unemployed while fi(XtSjt) is the endogenous 
probability of finding a job in the next period with Xt denoting the aggregate 
matching rate.
I assume that the period-by-period felicity function is of the constant relative 
risk aversion (C R RA ) form:
U(cjt) = p ^ 1 . p >  0
(1.11) U(cj t) =  ln(cjt), p =  1
5The way this error component is introduced resembles an expenditure shock i.e. the individual 
encounters a shock after the wage has been agreed and paid. I do it in this way because it 
does not affect the firm’s problem and hence simplifies the solution considerably. As mentioned 
previously, this shock is mainly used in order to amplify agent heterogeneity.
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while the disutility of search will be given by:
(1 .1 2 ) G(sjt) =  sjt, 7  > 1
When an individual is unemployed, she will have to decide how much to search 
in order to improve her chances of finding a job in the subsequent period. In this, 
I follow the standard practice in the literature [see, for example, Costain (1999) 
and Lentz (2005)] and assume that the probability of finding a job in period t +  1 
is given by:
(1.13) V&tSjt) =  1 -  exp(-A tsjt)
The latter is strictly increasing and concave in Sjt and satisfies the properties that
lim fi(XtSjt) —> 0
S j t - *  o
and
lim fJL(Xtsjt) —► 1
S j  £  ^oo
Given the above specification and by defining as V?t and the value functions 
of the employment and unemployment states respectively, the recursive formulation 
of the household problem can be written as:
(1.14) V°t{xjt) =  max{U(xJt -  bjt) + /?[(1 -  6)EtV^+1(xjt+1) + 6EtVjl+1(xjt+1)}}
b j t + i
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Vjtlpji) = max {U(xj t - b jt) - G ( s jt) +
b j t + l , s j t
(1.15) +p[ii(\tSjt)EtVjt+\(xjt+i) +  (1 — v(h8jt))EtVji+i(xjt+i)]}
The solution to this problem consists of three policy functions, namely consumption 
when employed, consumption when unemployed and the choice of search intensity. 
I will discuss later the appropriate solution method since the present model is 
analytically intractable when bjt > 0 .
1.2.2. Firms
Regarding the firm side of the economy, I closely follow the standard search and 
matching framework pioneered by Mortensen (1978) and Pissarides (1984,1985 and 
2000). For simplicity, I abstract from endogenous capital decisions and endogenous 
job destruction. I will assume that each job employs one worker while I keep the 
productivity of a job (p) constant in time. As a result, the value function J  for an 
active job i (i.e. a job that is already occupied by a worker) satisfies the following 
equation:
^ ^
(1.16) Ji t = p - k - w it + — —Ji t + 1
1 +  r
where k is the total capital cost, assumed to be exogenous and fixed.
At the beginning of each period a number of unemployed agents (queue) apply 
to each job vacancy i based on the wage contract wit that is posted by the individual 
firm i. The choice of the wage contract is such that the firm maximizes profits
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from a vacant job subject to providing a minimum Vtu to its job applicants and 
subject to the constraint imposed by (1.16).
Based on the posted wage contract, the search intensity, the number of va­
cancies and the number of unemployed individuals, some searchers will become 
matched and some vacant jobs will become filled. The rest will continue to search 
until they meet their partner in a subsequent period.
Before proceeding to the next section and in order to facilitate the notation 
used, one should note that the infinite structure of the problem implies a station­
ary equilibrium at which J , vacancies, unemployment and wages are all constant. 
Thus, all time subscripts that refer to aggregate and firm variables can, and will 
be dropped.
1.2.3. Transition probabilities
As discussed earlier, the individual transition probability from the unemployment 
to the employment pool is an increasing function of search intensity and the match­
ing coefficient. The latter is common to all agents and is implemented in order to 
capture the idea of search externalities. That said, it is harder for an individual 
to find a job the more unemployed agents there are in the economy and easier 
the higher the number of vacancies available. More specifically, I assume that the 
functional form of the matching coefficient is given by:
where u is the unemployment rate, v is the vacancy rate (expressed in terms of 
total population which is assumed to be equal to the constant size of the labour 
force L ) and a  is assumed to be constant and take values in the open interval 
(0,1). 0  is a scaling factor. It is straightforward to show that A is increasing in 
v/u, a variable which is commonly referred to in the literature as market tightness 
(6). The average transition probability is then defined by:
(1.18) ji[0, h(sj)] =  J [i -  exp(—A(9)sj )]dji Jle > 0
j
for some function h of all individual search intensities. One might equally think 
of h as a non-linear function of average search effort. For the sake of simplicity, 
I will denote this average probability as p,(0, h)6. One has to remember however, 
that this average transition rate is influenced by market tightness and individual 
search intensities.
Regarding transitions from vacancies to active jobs, I will concentrate only at 
the symmetric equilibrium i.e. the case at which each firm posts the same wage 
contract (see below) and hence market tightness is the same in all firm queues. By 
definition then, the probability of finding a worker is given by:
matches matches u , . 1  ..
(U 9) 9  =  — —  =  — — v =  m  h)e = q{~9' h)
6Note that in the case of a linear probability function n(sjt ) =  XtSjt, the average transition rate 
would simply be Jl{0, s) =  As, where h =  s.
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since fi is by definition equal to matches/uL. As a result, one can write:
(1 .2 0 ) J l { 6 ,  h) =  0q{0, h)
1.2.4. Search equilibrium
I have so far specified the returns to workers, unemployed agents and active jobs for 
given transitional rates and wages. In this section I close the model by analysing 
job creation that consists of the description of a wage rule and market tightness.
The important thing to realize is that the agents’ asset accumulation poses a 
considerable difficulty in deriving wage rules since individuals Eire now heteroge­
neous with respect to their wealth. If one wanted to tackle the problem by re­
solving to Nash bargaining in individual meetings (a common approach in search 
and matching models) or any other rule that is based on a one-to-one negotia­
tion, she would be immediately confronted with the problem of keeping track of 
an infinite-dimensional object. Since the agent’s surplus (i.e. the difference be­
tween the value of the employment and unemployment state) is specific to each 
individual, it follows that the division of the joint surplus and thus the wage are 
also agent-specific. On the other hand, assuming that individual agreements are 
based on market averages does not provide a convincing story. To overcome this 
difficulty, I base my approach on wage posting similar in spirit to Moen (1997) and 
Pissarides (2001).
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Suppose that firm i has a vacancy to fill and therefore it posts a wage contract, 
conditional on the arrival of the destructive shock. Assume that unemployed agents 
allocate themselves to each queue in such a way so that no one can be made better 
off by changing queue. Thus, each one enjoys the return of the unemployment 
state which is agent-specific and faces her own prospect of becoming employed in 
the next period.
The expected return of an unemployed agent j  that has joined queue i is V ^ t 
and is given by (1.15)7. However, in order to make each firm post a single wage 
contract to all of its job applicants, I will assume that every firm has knowledge 
only about the average values of wealth, search and transition probability in the 
economy. This is the only assumption I make regarding the firm’s information 
set. On one hand, it can be considered as sensible since it can be nearly impos­
sible to observe the wealth stock of each and every individual and on the other 
hand it makes the problem tractable as it implies a single wage offer. Note that 
conceptually this assumption is not the same as conjecturing that the outcome of 
the Nash bargaining is based on market averages because wage posting does not 
involve firm-agent meetings that are agent-specific in nature.
Denote as V™ and Vf  the average values of unemployment and employment 
states respectively in queue i with:
(1.21) V" = UU -  G + m < liW  +  (1 -  0i<k)V?]
7This is the same expression as that of equation (1.15) but with a subscript i included to denote 
that the individual has joined queue i.
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( 1.22) V ‘ =  U‘ +  m  -  t ) V ‘ +  SV“]
where Uu =  U(cu), Ue — U(ce) and G = G(s) denote utility when unemployed, 
employed and disutility of search evaluated at the average values of consumption 
and search respectively. Note that the structure of our setup implies that all mean 
values are constant and thus no time subscripts and no expectation operators 
are required. Let also V u be the returns from joining the queue with the most 
attractive posted contract. Then the constraint facing firm i is:
(1.23) Vtu > V u
The important implication of the above is that it explicitly takes into account 
the agents’ outside option value i.e. the benefits received when unemployed and 
the buffer stock of wealth and thus it creates a feedback channel between the UI 
benefit, the asset holdings and the equilibrium labour income.
The firm is assumed to select a wage by maximizing the present discounted 
value of a vacant job subject to (1.23). Vacant jobs can enter the market at any 
time to participate in the matching process. Let IL be the expected profits from 
joining queue i with a vacant job. Assume now that there are no job creation costs 
but maintaining a vacant job open costs pc per period, for some c > 0. The value 
of the vacancy then, satisfies:
(1-24) Ui = -p c  +  - +  (1 -  ft)n<]
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Given the flat wage profile, the maximization problem is:
(1.25) maxlli =  ^ x ^ ( - p c +Wifii r +  qi 1 +  v
subject to
(1.26) Ji = ^ ^ ( p - k - w i)r +  o
(1-27) i ?  =  J -W , {Uu - G  + 0OtqtV?) >  V*1 -  p[l -  Viqil
(1.28) V? =  l _  ^  _  (Ue +  p5Vu)
Maximization with respect to Wi and 9i gives:
<■*> -  n,)]- -
tfC -A,+^ < f  - or)+0r-S-iiO
(1-30) ~  n ‘) =dOi r + qt
_  e
where £ is the Lagrange multiplier. Any changes to the wage and market tightness 
will affect individual search intensity and thus the average transition probabilities,
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an effect that needs to be taken into account by the firm when making its decision. 
The wage rule is then derived by substituting (1.29) into (1.30):
„ 31| v -  •
OiQi 1 - 0 ( 1 - 6 )
[ l l r  _  J j P p n * )  +  ?  _  ?  + eve ,
r  +  d qi Qi l  — p ( l  — o)
where 1 — e is the elasticity of #*<?* - the average job finding probability - with 
respect to market tightness (see Appendix l.A). Note that with linear probability 
and Cobb Douglas matching rate, e — a. In this case however, with a non-linear 
probability function, a  is a parameter that controls the relevant elasticity but is 
not exactly equal to it.
Given market tightness, (1.31) is solved to determine the wage contract that 
maximizes 11*. In the absence of savings and variable search intensity, when utility 
is linear and 0 — (1*31) reduces to:
(i.32) {v ‘ -  k u) =  -  rij)
1 — £
which is equation (41) in Pissarides (2001). Although (1.32) is a simplification of
(1.31), it provides the basic intuition. Both of these equations entail that the agreed 
wage rate will depend on workers’ outside option. As a result, when unemployment 
benefits decrease there will be pressure for a decrease in wages since individuals’ 
position deteriorates. But a reduction in benefits makes prudent agents save more,
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something which tends to improve their "bargaining strength". The net effect will 
clearly impact on the equilibrium wage, the unemployment and vacancy rates and 
thus on aggregate welfare. It is worth noting that monotonicity of both sides of
(1.31) cannot in general be established but the simulations yielded always a single 
wage solution.
In order to derive the value of market tightness, I focus on the symmetric 
equilibrium i.e. 0* =  6 for all i and I impose the usual zero-profit condition on 
new job creation by assuming that firms will create vacant jobs up to the point 
where all rents from job creation are exhausted. This implies that 11* =  0 for all i. 
Hence, at the symmetric equilibrium:
(1 .3 3 ) £  =  ( P - k - w )
q r  4-0
The left hand side is the expected cost of maintaining a job vacant (since -  
is the expected duration of a vacancy) while the right hand side is the expected 
profit from an active job. In other words, (1.33) is something like a labour demand 
curve that equates revenue to cost.
1.2.5. Solution M ethod
I generalize the Deaton (1991) solution to allow for search during the unemploy­
ment state by deriving the three Euler equations associated with the three control 
variables (see Appendix l.B):
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(1.34) Uc(cejt) =  mBx{Uc(x‘t) ,0(1 +  r)[(l -  8)EtUc(c‘t+1) +  SEtUc(c]t+1)}}
(1.35)
Uc(c]t) =  max{Uc(x]t) ,p ( l  + r)[ii(\sjt)EtUc{cejt+1) 
+(1 -  a*(A sjt))EtUc(c*t+l)}}
and
(1.36)
where the superscripts e and u refer to the employment and unemployment states 
respectively. The first two Euler equations are a straightforward generalization of 
Deaton (1991). If the individual is employed and liquidity constrained in period 
t, consumption cannot be higher than her cash on hand Xjt and as as result the 
marginal utility of consumption cannot be lower than Uc(xjt). If on the other hand, 
the borrowing limit is not binding, then optimality dictates that current marginal 
utility should be equated to the expected discounted future one (Hall, 1978). The 
latter takes into account the possibility that the individual may become unem­
ployed in the next period, hence it is weighted by the (exogenous) probabilities 
5 and 1 — 5. The same logic applies to an unemployed individual in the current 
period. Now, however, expected marginal utility of next period consumption has 
to be weighted by the (endogenous) probabilities of finding a job or not.
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The third Euler equation derives the decision for search. It states that at the 
optimum an unemployed agent will choose search effort to equate the marginal cost 
of search to the discounted future benefits of it. The discounted expected benefits 
are the product of the marginal increase in the probability of finding employment 
from an additional unit of search (fis(Xsjt)) and the discounted expected benefit 
from employment relative to unemployment. The latter benefit is quantified by 
the term (3(EtV^ t+1 — EtV^+1) which computes the discounted expected difference 
between employment and unemployment in t +  1 .
Finally, one should note that the state variable x  evolves differently according 
to whether the individual is unemployed or not in the current period and the next. 
The four different possibilities are:
(1.37) xft+1 = (1 +  r)bejt + (1 -  T)wejt+i
(1.38) x<ji+\ =  (1 +  r Wjt +  (1 — T)z
(1.39) arjJJj =  (1 +  r)bujt +  ( 1  -  t ) z
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(1 .4 0 ) Zjt+i  =  (1 +  r )b ] t +  (1 -  T)w ej t + i
1.2.6. Calibration of Parameters
The model is calibrated to match features of US data. I consider the unit of 
analysis to be one month because typically unemployment duration is short and a 
quarterly calibration will throw away too much information.
I set f3 equal to 0.996 (which corresponds to a monthly discount rate of 0.0042 
and an annual one of 0.05) and the constant real interest rate, r, equal to 0.0016 
(which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 0 .0 2 ). Such a relationship between 
the two aforementioned parameters implies consumer impatience. Borrowing con­
straints are not relevant for patient agents as these individuals are inherently in­
clined to accumulate positive amounts of assets and hence there would be no upper 
bound to wealth.
Regarding the coefficient of risk aversion, some of the literature on unemploy­
ment insurance assumes values close to l 8. Others, like Acemoglou and Shimer 
(1999) and Joseph and Weitzenblum (2003) use a value of 3, while Hansen and 
Imrohoroglu (1992) set it equal to 2.5. Finally, Lentz (2005) estimates its value
8See for instance, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Costain (1999), Davidson and Woodbury 
(1998), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and Wang and Williamson (2002).
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to be around 2.2 for the Danish economy. I choose to be somewhere in the mid­
dle and set the value of p equal to 1.2 but I also report results for a different 
parameterization.
I set <j c equal to 0.05 which results in an 8  percent standard deviation, very 
close to the estimated figure of 10 percent (Carroll, 1992). In my case however, this 
is not exactly a labour income shock but it suffices to amplify the heterogeneity 
among individuals. I normalize productivity p by 1 and set S equal to 0.03 based 
on the estimates of Abowd and Zellner (1985) and the Job Openings and Labour 
Turnover Survey for the period 2000 - 2004. Finally k is set equal to 0.35, which 
implies that capital has a share of 35 percent of total productivity.
Regarding the baseline N R R , Gruber (1997) documents that the average re­
placement ratio in 1987 in his sample (the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, PSID) 
is around 0.426 while Meyer (1990) reports an average N R R  of around 0.7 (using 
Continuous Wage and History Data, 1985a and 1985b). In addition, Hopenhayn 
and Nicolini (1997) report that with some variation across states ”...the current 
system provides workers with a replacement rate of approximately 60 percent...”. 
The OECD in Benefits and Wages (2002) calculates an average N R R  of around 
0.35. The latter however is the total benefits paid to unemployed agents for a total 
duration of 60 months. On the other hand, the average N R R  (including some 
housing benefits) for the first month of the unemployment spell ranges from 0.57 
to 0 . 6  (depending on the marital status of the agent) in the same study. Since
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in my simulation no agent is unemployed for more than 4 consecutive months, I 
consider it sensible to aim for a benchmark N R R  close to 0.5.
Regarding the value of a, I choose to follow Blanchard and Diamond (1989) 
who estimate it to be in the range of 0.45 to 0.55, failing to reject constant returns 
to scale. For this reason I set its baseline value equal to 0.5.
I set the value of 0  equal to 1.3 in order to generate an unemployment rate in 
the neighborhood of 5.5 to 6  percent. This target value for the unemployment rate 
is based on the monthly series that is readily available from the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics and spans the last thirty years. At the same time, I set 7  equal to 2  (which 
implies a quadratic utility for search) in order to match an average consumption 
drop in the range of 10 to 14 percent . This last targeted value is based on two 
empirical studies. The first one is due to Gruber (1997) who documents - by using 
data from the PSID - that transitions from the employment to the unemployment 
state are on average associated with a 7 percent drop in food consumption. His 
sample however, contains information about food consumption only. In a related 
study Browning and Crossley (2001) by using a Canadian data set, find that mean 
total consumption falls by around 14 percent with unemployment.
Finally, I choose to calibrate c in order to achieve a market tightness in the 
range 0.5 to 1 [like Shimer (2005)] and not exceed a cost of maintaining a vacancy 
of 2 monthly wages [like Holmlund and Fredriksson (2001)]. For this reason I 
set c equal to 0 . 2  which resulted in an expected cost of maintaining a vacancy
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approximately equal to around 0.5 of monthly wage and an equilibrium market 
tightness equal to 0.82.
Table 1.1 summarizes these benchmark parameter values.
1.3. Model Results
1.3.1. Policy functions
The consumption policy functions are plotted in figure 1 and the search intensity 
(expressed as the probability of finding a job when unemployed) in figure 2 . Con­
sumption is equal to cash on hand when the borrowing constraint is binding and 
saving becomes positive beyond a certain point generating a concave consump­
tion function. As it is evident, an unemployed agent starts saving earlier than an 
employed one because of the increased uncertainty to finance her consumption in 
the next period. Notice also that the difference between the two policy functions 
diminishes as wealth increases because accumulated assets become more and more 
sufficient to finance consumption despite of the fact that an unemployed agent 
receives lower income than that of a worker. On the other hand, search intensity 
is flat for low values of cash on hand and decreases beyond a certain level. The 
profile is flat because for poor and borrowing constrained individuals an extra unit 
of cash on hand will be consumed entirely, leaving thus the incentives for search 
unchanged. These incentives however, decrease with wealth for richer agents since 
people who are able to save can afford longer unemployment spells. It should 
be emphasized that this negative wealth effect on search decisions is consistent
with the findings of Cremieux et al. (1995), Lentz and Tranaes (2 0 0 2 ) and Algan, 
Cheron, Hairault and Langot (2003) who report that wealth has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on unemployment duration.
1.3.2. Benchmark model results
This part of the chapter is concerned with determining the optimal level of un­
employment insurance from an aggregate perspective. More specifically, I vary 
the benefit provision and discuss the implications for aggregate welfare. I begin 
my analysis by considering the model where individuals do not have access to any 
means of saving. In order to make this version of the model comparable with the 
benchmark scenario (the model with savings), I elect to re-calibrate some of the 
parameters to achieve approximately the same targeted values that were set for the 
baseline case. For this reason, I set c equal to 0.45 and 0  equal to 1.225 so that the 
simulated unemployment and vacancy rates as well as the transition probabilities 
between the two models closely resemble one another when the UI benefit is set 
equal to its benchmark value. This makes the comparison of consumer behaviour 
fair and straightforward.
The simulated results for this model are reported in Table 1.2. In general, 
mean individual consumption of the employed falls with unemployment insurance 
following the increase in taxation, a measure necessary to finance the generosity 
of the system. However, average consumption of the unemployed rises because the 
unemployment benefit increases. As a result, unemployment insurance is having
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a significant effect in smoothing consumption drops from the employment to the 
unemployment state. Still however, these drops are quite pronounced because of 
the absence of any instrument of self-insurance.
The equilibrium wage rate increases with the level of unemployment insurance, 
a result which is quite standard in all search models of unemployment that feature 
an endogenous wage process but lack the concept of savings. The reason is that 
higher benefits imply that the value of the unemployment state increases relative 
to that of employment. As a result, agents need to be compensated more in order 
to retain incentives to search or work, hence the wage rises with UI.
Turning to the rest of the simulated results, one observes that average search 
intensity declines with UI provision, evidence that individuals reduce the costly ac­
tivity of search when compensated more during the unemployment spell (the moral 
hazard effect). At the same time, the unemployment rate increases while vacancies 
decline following the increase in the cost of labour. The aggregate matching rate 
decreases sharply and consequently the average job finding probability is lower at 
higher levels of UI.
I now proceed to examine the welfare implications of UI provision. The last row 
of Table 1.2 calculates the aggregate welfare gain obtained when moving from each 
different level of the unemployment benefit to the optimal one. More specifically, 
it measures the percentage increase in the certainty equivalence of consumption cz
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at benefit z, where the latter is defined as the solution to the following equation:
(1.41)
where
(1.42) Wz = / [(1 — v)Vj +  uV^]dj, at benefit z
j
As can be readily seen from the calculations in Table 1 .2 , the optimal level 
of unemployment insurance is equal to 0.3 where the implied replacement rate 
is 47.78 percent. In other words, in the absence of any means of self-insurance 
the baseline scenario appears to be the optimal one. As benefits rise, there is 
an initial improvement in aggregate welfare because unemployed individuals are 
able to consume more. Although taxation increases, some the adverse effects of 
higher UI are partly offset by the increases in the equilibrium wage rate which 
acts so as to improve the welfare of the already employed (at least compared with 
a case of a constant wage). As a result, some UI provision is beneficial in such 
an environment. As unemployment insurance keeps rising further however, the 
disincentive effect together with the reduction in vacancies grow too large and thus 
the unemployment rate increases quickly, something which deteriorates aggregate 
welfare. Overall, the welfare gains from unemployment insurance provision can be 
very large. If, for example, the initial provision is set to zero, then the certainty
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equivalence of consumption would rise by an impressive 10.58 percent, should the 
policy makers decide to increase benefits to the 0.3 level.
I now proceed by solving and simulating the model with the endogenous wage 
process in the presence of savings, using the baseline parameterization discussed 
in the previous section. Results are reported in Table 1.3. Mean consumption 
of both the employed and the unemployed falls with unemployment insurance, 
although on average it is higher than that reported in the previous case. The most 
important thing to document, is that mean individual savings decrease sharply 
with unemployment insurance. As the social assistance becomes progressively 
more generous, impatient agents optimally decide to reduce asset accumulation 
since the unemployment state becomes less costly to endure and the threat of 
facing the liquidity constraint diminishes. The latter illustrates the substitution 
between public and private insurance. More specifically, when the implied net 
replacement rate is approximately equal to 78 percent, savings of the employed are 
around 8  times lower than those associated with a 0 unemployment benefit. On 
the other hand, mean individual consumption drop seems to vary little at all levels 
of unemployment insurance, evidence that individual savings are quite sufficient 
to smooth the transition from the employment to the unemployment state. At a 
replacement rate of 78 percent however, this consumption drop is reduced to 12.10 
percent.
Turning now to the aggregate implications of UI, one immediately observes two 
things that are in contrast with the previous results. The first one indicates that
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the equilibrium wage rate is on average around 2 . 6  percent higher than the wage 
negotiated in the no-savings scenario. This follows the improved threat point of 
agents who are now in a position to "negotiate" a higher labour income. The other 
thing is that the equilibrium wage rate has a relatively flat profile across different 
levels of unemployment insurance. The reason is that the negotiation process is 
subject to opposing forces. On one hand, the increase in benefits tends to put 
upward pressure on wages because it makes the unemployment state less costly 
and thus firms need to make contracts more generous to attract job applicants. 
On the other hand, as benefits rise impatient individuals respond by lowering their 
stock of assets thereby worsening their "bargaining strength". It turns out that for 
the given parameterization, the two effects almost cancel each other and therefore, 
the equilibrium wage remains relatively unchanged at all levels of unemployment 
insurance. At a 0  percent replacement rate, equilibrium labour income is around 
4.2 percent higher than the one obtained previously.
The moral hazard effect is clearly present since average search effort declines 
with UI provision and is almost halved as the replacement rate increases from 0 
to 78 percent. Naturally, unemployment increases and the matching rate together 
with the average job finding probability decrease sharply while taxation rises in 
order to finance the generosity of the system.
Turning now to the welfare implications, one notices that the gains of abolishing 
the unemployment insurance scheme are non trivial. Based on the results of the 
simulated model, the optimal replacement rate is found to be equal to 0  percent
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while the certainty equivalence of consumption would rise by 0.76 percent if the 
policy maker decided to reduce the UI from its baseline level to the optimal one. 
At the same time the unemployment rate would decline by almost 17 percent 
following the increase in the intensity of search effort.
Results are different from before because agents have access to a means of 
self insurance that enables them to protect themselves against the unemployment 
risk. At the same time, the wage negotiation process can be important. With 
a sufficient stock of savings and no further improvement in labour income (like 
before), the adverse effects of UI on aggregate welfare through a declining job 
finding probability due to moral hazard are quite large, indicating that in such an 
economy the importance of UI provision diminishes significantly.
Naturally, one may wonder how important the wage negotiation process is. 
Costain (1999) correctly observes that subtle changes to the wage rule may impact 
considerably on the final result. As it was mentioned previously, the labour income 
determination can be extremely complicated in the presence of wealth heterogene­
ity. Nevertheless, it is true that changes to the wage negotiation process and its 
sensitivity to different UI provision levels can be very important. The present work 
argues that the aforementioned wage rule strikes a reasonable compromise between 
modelling tractability and economic intuition. At the same time, it advocates that 
it is the combination of both - savings and the specific wage determination - that 
leads to the results reported. Table 1.4 illustrates exactly this point; I maintain the 
assumption that agents are precautionary savers but this time a vary exogenously
43
the wage to show that the UI optimality and the associated welfare benefits do not 
depend only on the agents’ buffer stock of assets. My benchmark scenario remains 
unchanged but now the wage increases exogenously as UI benefits rise. Initially 
(Scenario 1 in Table 1.4), I increase the wage by a constant 5% with every 0.1 
increase in the unemployment benefit. This enables employed individuals to in­
crease their consumption and as a result the certainty equivalence of consumption 
rises monotonically with UI. In the second case (Scenario 2), I allow for a concave 
increase in the wage profile, something that initially boosts consumption of em­
ployed considerably. This time however, the gains from higher wages diminish and 
are offset by the losses due to higher unemployment. As a result, the benchmark 
case is the optimal one. Together, these results outline the fact that it is the joint 
contribution of savings and the wage process that matters for the determination 
of the optimal unemployment insurance program.
1.4. Risk aversion
In this section, I check the robustness of the previous findings by raising the 
coefficient of risk aversion to 2.4. I re-calibrate each model in order to attain 
approximately the same targeted values as before, so I set c equal to 0.65 and © 
equal to 0.7 for the no-savings scenario while the same parameters are assigned 
the values of 0.18 and 0.92 respectively for the model with savings.
Results for the first case are reported in Table 1.5. Given that agents are 
now more risk averse, they are willing to negotiate a lower wage at each level
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of unemployment insurance and hence their average consumption is reduced. The 
path of equilibrium labour income is still increasing however, because benefits affect 
the relative values of the two states. Without any means of self-insurance, a higher 
degree of risk aversion induces agents to want more state provided assistance than 
before. Hence, the optimal unemployment benefit is found to be equal to 0.4 where 
the implied net replacement rate is 64.66 percent (an increase of around 35 percent 
compared with the previous case). Understandably, unemployment insurance is 
more welfare improving than before. Changing benefits from the baseline system to 
the optimal one generates an increase in the certainty equivalence of consumption 
equal to 0.52 percent. In the absence of savings, these numbers reveal how sensitive 
our conclusions can be to the choice of the degree of risk aversion. These findings 
are in line with previous relevant studies that establish a positive relationship 
between risk aversion and demand for state provided insurance [see, for instance, 
Davidson and Woodbury (1998)].
I now turn to the case with savings, in an attempt to see if these conclusions 
carry over to the richer model. Table 1.6 reports individual and aggregate results 
when the degree of risk aversion is equal to 2.4. The most apparent feature of 
the simulated data is that individual savings increase considerably. In the current 
framework, an increase of risk aversion is equivalent to an increase in prudence. 
Hence, more prudent agents decide optimally to save more. Apart from the extreme 
case of z = 0.5, assets are on average around 55 percent higher than in the baseline 
model and as a result consumption drops are dramatically smaller at all levels of
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UI. Following the increase in asset accumulation, the equilibrium wage income 
turns out to be approximately the same as the one negotiated with a lower degree 
of risk aversion. All though per se risk averse individuals would be willing to 
accept a lower wage, the larger buffer stock of assets improves their position in the 
bargain. Hence, the equilibrium wage falls on average by a very small 0.05 percent 
compared to a 2.65 percent in the no-savings scenario.
As before, the last row of Table 1.6, reports the welfare gains of UI. Despite the 
increase in risk aversion, the optimal unemployment benefit is found to be equal to 
0  and the aggregate welfare benefits of moving from the baseline replacement rate 
to the optimal one are still non-trivial (0.99 percent). This contrasts with the pre­
vious findings and with most of the existing theoretical literature. This divergence 
can be attributed to two reasons: the increase in the amount of self-insurance and 
the endogenous matching rate. Since people accumulate more assets they become 
better insured against the unemployment hazard. At the same time, more risk 
averse agents are more adversely affected by the reduction in the aggregate match­
ing rate. Consequently, unemployment insurance provision is still not a desirable 
feature, even for more risk averse individuals, at least on the aggregate.
1.5. Heterogeneity, wealth and unemployment insurance
Our previous discussion suggests that savings work as an instrument that sub­
stitutes public insurance provision. The latter, embodied in a framework with an 
endogenous wage process resulted in a zero optimal UI, from an aggregate welfare
46
perspective. However, the present model is a model of heterogeneous agents in 
which each individual holds a different amount of assets. Some individuals may 
have been unlucky enough and were not able to build any stock of savings while 
others may have accumulated very few assets. One is tempted to wonder therefore, 
if the previous results vary among different wealth groups. If they do, then it would 
be interesting to see the implications for the optimal N R R  and its associated wel­
fare gains for each different group as well as determining the minimum amount of 
savings necessary to buffer completely the unemployment hazard. These issues are 
both intriguing and important because they are related to the uniform provision 
of the UI system and means testing.
In order to explore this area, I divide individuals to groups based on their wealth 
holdings (expressed as percentages of average savings). Following my previous 
practice, I vary the UI provision and calculate the mean of the certainty equivalence 
of consumption in each group. This enables me to identify the optimal replacement 
rate and the accompanied welfare gains of UI provision for each wealth group.
Table 1.7 summarizes results for six different savings groups, namely individuals 
who hold assets between 0% —10%, 10% —20%, 20% —30%, 30% —40%, 40% —50% 
and more than 50% of average wealth. For simplicity, I will refer to these groups 
as groups 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 . The first row of Table 1.6 reports the optimal UI, 
the second the implied optimal N R R  and the last one the average welfare gains 
obtained for each individual group when the unemployment benefit changes from
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0  (which is the optimal policy based on aggregate welfare) to each group’s optimal 
level.
The pattern is unambiguous. Both, the optimal UI provision and its welfare 
benefits fall with savings. Individuals who could not build a significant stock 
of assets require more insurance than richer individuals. More specifically, very 
poor agents (those that belong to group 1) would prefer a 46.88 replacement rate 
while those of group 2  would opt for a lower N R R  equal to 31.25. Groups 3,4 
and 5 would see their welfare maximized if the replacement rate was equal to 
15.63 but richer individuals would benefit if UI was set equal to zero. It is worth 
noting that the welfare gains of UI do not simply vary between groups that desire 
different replacement rates but vary between groups with the same optimal NRR. 
In terms of the certainty equivalence of consumption, group 3 benefits five times 
more than group 5 despite the fact that all these individuals would choose the 
same replacement rate.
Table 1.7 provides also information about the amount of savings necessary to 
buffer fully the unemployment risk. When an individual is able to accumulate 
assets greater than or equal to 50 percent of average wealth, then she is fully 
covered against the hazard of unemployment. When z = 0 and the implied N R R  — 
0%, mean savings are equal to 1.6655. Therefore, assets equal to around 1.3 (or 
more) of the equilibrium monthly wage would be sufficient to guard against the 
unemployment risk without the need of additional state provided assistance. This 
result should be expected to vary however, with different unemployment durations.
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Overall, this section outlines that heterogeneity (and thus the wealth distribu­
tion) does matter for the optimality of UI. The results are interesting because, after 
all, this is an economy populated by ex ante identical consumers who enjoy the 
same level of wage. Due to idiosyncratic labour income fluctuations and different 
employment histories however, not all individuals prefer the same amount of state 
provided unemployment insurance. Poor agents require non-trivial replacement 
rates while richer consumers would be better off with no additional insurance.
1.6. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the optimality and the accompanied welfare im­
plications of unemployment insurance provision. Such a task was undertaken by 
incorporating the basic ingredients of the buffer stock saving model into the search 
theoretic approach to the labour market. The equilibrium wage was made ex­
plicitly dependant to the outside options of workers/searchers while the aggregate 
matching rate was endogenously determined. The resulting model was not analyt­
ically tractable so a numerical solution method had to be employed. Calibration 
was done on a monthly frequency since average US unemployment duration is short 
and any lower frequency would throw away too much information.
Savings together with the moral hazard effect and the wage profile across differ­
ent UI benefits, seem to diminish greatly the importance of unemployment insur­
ance provision. Based on an aggregate welfare metric, the optimal net replacement 
rate in the benchmark scenario was found to be equal to 0  percent with non-trivial
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gains for consumption. A higher degree of risk aversion did not seem to have an 
effect on this finding, because more prudent individuals accumulate more assets 
and thus are well covered against the unemployment risk.
Ex post heterogeneity is important however. A common wage income is not 
enough to suggest a uniform UI system. Different employment histories and idio­
syncratic income fluctuations lead individuals to accumulate different amounts of 
assets. This affects not only the desirability of UI provision but the associated 
welfare gains among different wealth groups.
Since savings are so important, modelling idiosyncratic labour income fluctua­
tions more realistically - i.e. using an AR{ 1 ) process - might have implications for 
the optimality of unemployment insurance. It is not clear however, at which di­
rection the results would point. Persistent shocks will negatively affect the ability 
of unlucky individuals to accumulate enough assets to buffer the unemployment 
risk, something which could indicate that some UI provision is beneficial. How­
ever, agents that recognize the persistent nature of the shocks might be inclined to 
save even more in good times, thereby increasing their stock of assets. The final 
outcome would depend on the net effect between these two opposing forces.
Future work could examine the case of multiple benefits being offered at the 
same time to different individuals based on their stocks of assets. Transitional dy­
namics might also be taken into account, similar in spirit to Joseph and Weitzen- 
blum (2003) and Lentz (2006). Finally, endogenizing the interest rate may be an
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additional dimension worth exploring as this would affect the cost of savings and 
thus the distribution of wealth holdings.
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Appendix l.A: The elasticity of the job finding rate
Define as eq the elasticity of q with respect to market tightness, i.e.:
Q
(l.A .l) eq = qd~, eq < 0
The elasticity of the average job finding rate (ji — 6q) is then given by:
Q
(1 .A.2 ) =  [q + 9qe]— = 1 + eq, > 0
By defining:
(1.A.3) e = —eq, e > 0
it follows that the elasticity of the average job finding rate is given by: 
(1.A.4) e^ = 1 — £
Appendix l.B: Solution algorithm
As discussed in the paper, there are two value functions depending on employ­
ment status (V e,V u). These are reproduced here to facilitate the analysis that
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follows:
(l.B .l) Vfcxjt) =  max{U(xjt -  b%) +  /3[(1 -  8)EtV£+1(xjt+1) + SEtV;t+1(xjt+1)]}
° j t + 1
Vji(.xjt) =  max {U(xj t -  b]t) -  G{sjt) +
bj t + l ’SJt
+fi[li(sjt)EtVjt+1(xjt+i) +  (1 — ii(sjt))EtVjt+1(xjt+i)]} (1.B.2)
Combining the first order necessary condition with respect to savings, the two enve- 
dV 6lope conditions { q^  = Uc(cjt) and =  Uc(djt)} and the possibility of a binding 
liquidity constraint, we can derive the first two Euler equations given by (1.34) 
and (1.35). The third Euler equation can be derived by differentiating (1.B.2) 
with respect to search intensity. One should note that because of the endogenous 
probabilities of finding employment in the next period, the value functions cannot 
be shown to be strictly concave [see Lentz and Tranaes (2004)] but the numerical 
solution (see below) yielded functions that were always globally concave.
Because of the max operators in the households’ policy functions [equations 
(1.34) and (1.35)], the problem cannot be solved analytically. For this reason I 
proceed with numeric evaluation. The single state variable (cash on hand, xt) 
is discretized into a certain number of grid points (say 1 0 0 ) with more points at 
lower values of cash on hand where the value function is more curved and the 
policy functions will have a kink. With this discretization at hand the solution 
algorithm is as follows:
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1 .: Make an initial guess about u, v (and hence A), Ji, r  and e
2.: Make an initial guess about the wage rate w
3.: Make an initial guess about the three policy and the two value functions
4.: Given the values in 1 and 2 as well as the conditions in 3, solve for 
savings when employed and unemployed and search using (1.34), (1.35) 
and (1.36) and the value functions using (1.14) and (1.15). Update at 3 
until policy and value functions converge
5.: Using the converged policy and value functions and the values in 1 and 
2 , simulate over all households to obtain V f and V™ and find the wage 
that solves (1.31).
6 .: With the policy functions from 4 and the wage rate from 5, simulate 
again to obtain an update for u, v, A, /x, r  and e
7.: Check initial with updated values. If their difference is sufficiently close 
to zero stop. Otherwise go back to 1 and update the values. Keep iterating 
until all seven variables and all policy and value functions have converged.
Interpolations along the single continuous state variable are performed using 
cubic spline interpolation and the upper bound of cash on hand is found by a trial 
and error method that ensures simulated liquid assets never exceed the chosen 
upper bound for cash on hand. Simulations are carried over 2000 individuals, which 
is a sufficient number for the i.i.d. shock to wash out. The time periods in each 
simulation are set so that the economy reaches a stationary equilibrium. Finally, 
iterations are terminated when initial and updated variables have converged up
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to the fourth digit. This makes comparative statics reliable for policy and welfare 
conclusions.
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Table 1.1 
Benchmark parameter values 
Monthly frequency
Discount factor j3 
Interest rate r 
Risk aversion p 
Disutility of search 7  
s.d. of income uncertainty a€
Elast. of the matching rate coef. a
0.996 Scaling factor 0 1.3
0.0016 Unempl. benefit (z) 0.3
1 .2 Job destruction rate S 0.03
2 Productivity p 1
0.05 Maintenance cost c 0 .2
0.5 Capital cost k 0.35
Notes to Table 1.1: The benchmark value of z was set equal to 0.3 because in the 
simulations it yielded a NRR  close to our targeted value of 50 percent.
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Table 1.2
Benchmark results, no savings
Monthly frequency
0 . 0
Unemployment benefit 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Individual results
Mean indiv. consumption (empl.) 0.6195 0.6199 0.6164 0.6102 0.5995 0.5748
Mean indiv. consumption (unempl.) 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.0993 0.1968 0.2916 0.3811 0.4562
Mean indiv. consumption drop (%) 1 0 0 .0 0 83.98 68.07 52.22 36.42 20.64
Aggregate results
Wage 0.6207 0.6242 0.6264 0.6279 0.6292 0.6301
Implied net repl. rate (%) 0 .0 0 16.02 31.93 47.78 63.57 79.35
Average search 1.0370 0.8840 0.7549 0.6469 0.5367 0.4007
Unemployment rate (%) 3.62 4.10 4.82 5.70 7.22 10.80
Vacancy rate (%) 5.98 5.24 4.82 446 4.13 3.81
Aggregate matching rate 1.5757 1.3848 1.2245 1.0832 0.9265 0.7284
Average job finding rate (%) 80.47 70.59 60.33 50.42 39.19 25.32
Tax rate (%) 0 .0 0 0.69 1.59 2.81 4.71 8.77
Welfare gain (%) 10.58 3.67 0.87 0.00 0.37 3.44
Notes to Table 1.2: The unemployment benefit is increased by the discrete amount of 
0.1 each time. The case of zero UI is actually approximated by a benefit of 0.03 in order
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to ensure that the code is successfully solved numerically (since the possibility of a zero 
consumption would imply an infinite marginal utility). This practice is implemented 
across all models and all simulations. Welfare gains measure the percentage change in 
the certainty equivalence of consumption by moving from each level of unemployment 
insurance to the optimal one.
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Table 1.3
Benchmark results, savings
Monthly frequency
Unemployment benefit
0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Individual results
Mean indiv. consumption (empl.) 0.6179 0.6163 0.6138 0.6104 0.6043 0.5912
Mean indiv. consumption (unempl.) 0.5265 0.5241 0.5214 0.5194 0.5174 0.5196
Mean indiv. savings (empl.) 1.8106 1.5548 1.1520 0.7955 0.4722 0.2138
Mean indiv. savings (unempl.) 1.1663 0.9728 0.6745 0.4256 0.2190 0.0951
Mean indiv. consumption drop (%) 14.78 14.95 15.06 14.90 14.38 1 2 .1 0
Aggregate results
Wage 0.6399 0.6400 0.6400 0.6399 0.6397 0.6392
Implied net repl. rate (%) 0.00 15.62 31.25 46.88 62.48 78.16
Average search 0.7501 0.7105 0.6578 0.5928 0.5117 0.3995
Unemployment rate (%) 4.63 4.87 5.21 5.70 6.62 8.57
Vacancy rate (%) 4.54 4.52 4.53 4.55 4.64 4.71
Aggregate matching rate 1.2980 1.2624 1.2231 1.1698 1.0965 0.9708
Average job finding rate (%) 62.08 59.16 55.21 50.00 42.91 32.15
Tax rate (%) 0.00 0.08 1.69 2.76 4.24 6.84
Welfare gain (%) 0.00 0 .1 2 0.37 0.76 1.55 3.50
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Notes to Table 1.3: The unemployment benefit is increased by the discrete amount of 
0.1 each time. The case of zero UI is actually approximated by a benefit of 0.03 in order 
to ensure that the code is successfully solved numerically (since the possibility of a zero 
consumption would imply an infinite marginal utility). This practice is implemented 
across all models and all simulations. Welfare gains measure the percentage change in 
the certainty equivalence of consumption by moving from each level of unemployment 
insurance to the optimal one.
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Table 1.4
Optimal UI, savings and exogenous wage
Monthly frequency
0 . 0
Unemployment benefit 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Scenario 1
Wage 0.5527 0.5804 0.6094 0.6399 0.6719 0.7055
Welfare gain (%) 16.67 11.50 6.82 4.83 2.74 0.00
Scenario 2
Wage 0.5689 0.5974 0.6213 0.6399 0.6527 0.6592
Welfare gain (%) 8.25 3.55 0.39 0.00 1 .0 2 3.34
Notes to Table 1.4: The unemployment benefit is increased by the discrete amount of 
0.1 each time. The case of zero UI is actually approximated by a benefit of 0.03 in order 
to ensure that the code is successfully solved numerically (since the possibility of a zero 
consumption would imply an infinite marginal utility). This practice is implemented 
across all models and all simulations. Welfare gains measure the percentage change in 
the certainty equivalence of consumption by moving from each level of unemployment 
insurance to the optimal one.
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Table 1.5 
p = 2.4, no savings 
Monthly frequency
0.0
Unemployment benefit 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Individual results
Mean indiv. consumption (empl.) 0.5819 0.5996 0.6029 0.5985 0.5863 0.5520
Mean indiv. consumption (unempl.) 0.0000 0.0994 0.1970 0.2914 0.3789 0.4441
Mean indiv. consumption drop (%) 1 0 0 .0 0 83.42 67.32 51.31 35.36 19.54
Aggregate results
Wage 0.5829 0.6032 0.6120 0.6162 0.6189 0.6215
Implied net repl. rate (%) 0 .0 0 16.58 32.68 48.68 64.66 80.45
Average search 2.5877 1.8596 1.4010 1.1016 0.8506 0.5961
Unemployment rate (%) 3.05 3.48 4.39 5.70 7.91 13.51
Vacancy rate (%) 9.54 6.59 5.35 4.72 4.21 3.64
Aggregate matching rate 1.2381 0.9631 0.7732 0.6366 0.5104 0.3633
Average job finding rate (%) 95.93 83.32 66.15 50.41 35.22 19.47
Tax rate (%) 0 .0 0 0.60 1.48 2 .8 6 5.26 11.17
Welfare gain (%) 107.26 20.36 4.62 0.52 0 .0 0 4.32
Notes to Table 1.5: The unemployment benefit is increased by the discrete amount of 
0.1 each time. The case of zero UI is actually approximated by a benefit of 0.03 in order
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to ensure that the code is successfully solved numerically (since the possibility of a zero 
consumption would imply an infinite marginal utility). This practice is implemented 
across all models and all simulations.Welfare gains measure the percentage change in 
the certainty equivalence of consumption by moving from each level of unemployment 
insurance to the optimal one.
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Table 1.6 
p = 2.4, savings 
Monthly frequency
0 . 0
Unemployment benefit 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Individual results
Mean indiv. consumption (empl.) 0.6159 0.6144 0.6127 0.6092 0.6034 0.5897
Mean indiv. consumption (unempl.) 0.5634 0.5605 0.5596 0.5553 0.5493 0.5440
Mean indiv. savings (empl.) 2.7064 2.4242 1.6880 1.1899 0.7466 0.4091
Mean indiv. savings (unempl.) 2.0528 1.8219 1.1922 0.7924 0.4523 0.2370
Mean indiv. consumption drop (%) 8.53 8.78 8 .6 6 8 .8 6 8.97 7.75
Aggregate results
Wage 0.6397 0.6401 0.6406 0.6406 0.6406 0.6404
Implied net repl. rate (%) 0.00 15.62 31.22 46.83 62.44 0.7808
Average search 0.9723 0.9305 0.9141 0.8310 0.7236 0.5684
Unemployment rate (%) 4.75 5.05 5.24 5.70 6.61 8.70
Vacancy rate (%) 5.22 4.98 4.70 4.69 4.70 4.61
Aggregate matching rate 0.9645 0.9136 0.8708 0.8336 0.7758 0.6701
Average job finding rate (%) 60.59 57.13 54.73 49.89 42.93 31.66
Tax rate (%) 0.00 0.08 1.70 2.76 4.23 6.93
Welfare gain (%) 0.00 0 .2 0 0.60 0.99 1.76 3.80
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Notes to Table 1.6: The unemployment benefit is increased by the discrete amount 
of 0.1 each time. The case of zero UI is actually approximated by a benefit of 0.03 in 
order to ensure that the code is successfully solved numerically (since the possibility of a 
zero consumption would imply an infinite marginal utility). This practice is implemented 
across all models and all simulations. Welfare gains measure the percentage change in 
the certainty equivalence of consumption by moving from each level of unemployment 
insurance to the optimal one.
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Table 1.7
Optimal UI and savings
Monthly frequency
G rp 1 G rp 2 G rp  3 G rp  4 G rp  5 G rp  6
Optimal UI 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Implied net repl. rate (%) 46.88 31.25 15.63 15.63 15.63 0.0
Welfare gain (%) 0.67 0.19 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.0
Notes to Table 1.7: Welfare gains measure the percentage change in the certainty 
equivalence of consumption by moving from a 0 replacement rate (i.e. the optimal N R R  
in the benchmark model based on aggregate welfare) to the optimal one for each different 
wealth group.
Groups are arranged as follows:
Grp 1: individuals with savings less than 10 percent of mean savings 
Grp 2: individuals with savings between 10 and 20 percent of mean savings
Grp 3: individuals with savings between 20 and 30 percent of mean savings
Grp 4: individuals with savings between 30 and 40 percent of mean savings
Grp 5: individuals with savings between 40 and 50 percent of mean savings
Grp 6: individuals with savings more than 50 percent of mean savings
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Figure 1.1: Consumption policy function
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CHAPTER 2
Chapter Two: Precautionary Saving, Search and 
Incom plete Information1
2.1. Introduction
Following our previous discussion, the present chapter attempts to identify 
the combined dynamics of consumption and unemployment in the presence of 
search and saving. Based on the seminal work by Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991) 
and Carroll (1992, 1997), precautionary savings models that feature liquidity con­
straints, undiversifiable labour income risk and some notion of impatience have 
been widely used to explain consumption dynamics2. At the same time, models 
featuring search frictions have been used to explain both the existence of equilib­
rium unemployment and unemployment dynamics. Although problems remain in 
explaining some business cycle phenomena [for example, the large variability in 
the vacancy-unemployment ratio, Shimer (2005)], the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) 
framework has been extensively used to understand unemployment fluctuations 
[for instance, Cole and Rogerson, (1999)]. Nevertheless, few studies have combined
1 Co-authored with Alex Michaelides, LSE.
2Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999), Gourinchas 
and Parker (2002) and Cagetti (2003) offer supporting evidence from microeconomic data for the 
life-cycle model.
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the basic insights from the two approaches to jointly examine the implications for 
unemployment and consumption dynamics3.
We think that this provides a potentially important gap in the literature be­
cause it is hard to argue a priori that unemployment and consumption should be 
studied separately, especially when both can be determined (fully or partially) by 
endogenously selected instruments like saving and search.
In order to confirm this intuition, we document a stylized fact from aggregate 
data, namely that non-durables consumption growth is negatively related to un­
employment growth over and above the excess sensitivity of consumption growth 
to labour income growth. Carroll and Dunn (1997) is an earlier study that is con­
sistent with this finding but they focus on unemployment expectations from survey 
data rather than actual unemployment figures. This finding seems consistent with 
microeconometric evidence from, for instance, Gruber (1997), who finds that food 
consumption drops by around 7% during the unemployment spell.
Given these empirical results, we see the purpose of this chapter as twofold: 
firstly we are interested in building, simulating and aggregating a model that fea­
tures two jointly determined instruments that guard against the income risk - 
namely saving and search - and then trying to understand any potentially inter­
esting results from their interaction on the aggregate level. Secondly, we want to
3Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Wang and Williamson (1996), Costain (1999) and Alvarez and 
Veracierto (2001) axe some examples that do so but these papers do not explicitly incorporate 
undiversifiable, idiosyncratic labor income risk.
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see whether our current framework is capable or not of explaining the empirical 
regularities that we observe in the data.
For these reasons, we embed search frictions in the precautionary savings model, 
thereby endogenously modeling consumption and unemployment. Recently, a num­
ber of papers has taken similar routes. Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2001) 
investigate the joint comovement of unemployment and consumption in a gen­
eral equilibrium setting but they do not endogeneize the search intensity decision 
during the unemployment state and do not focus on the aggregate relationships 
documented in this chapter. Benitez-Silva (2000) solves a model similar to the 
microeconomic model we study and finds that search intensity is decreasing over 
the life-cycle (a prediction consistent with microeconometric evidence) but does 
not investigate the aggregate implications of the model. More recently, Lentz 
(2005) and Algan et. al. (2003) offer empirical evidence suggesting that wealthier 
households search less than poorer ones for a new job and therefore exhibit higher 
unemployment durations. Nevertheless, our understanding of how these non-linear 
microeconomic models aggregate and whether they can replicate the observed co­
movements between consumption and unemployment remains at a nascent stage. 
Our study takes a step in that direction by investigating how a precautionary 
savings and search model - with ex post heterogeneity - aggregates.
To this end and apart from attempting to explain the empirical regularities, 
we view our setup as a step towards enhancing our understanding from combining
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precautionary savings and search models for aggregate fluctuations. We there­
fore abstract at this stage from general equilibrium considerations and take both 
wages and interest rates as exogenous. We make this choice because even the par­
tial equilibrium model is quite complex and needs to be solved numerically and 
substantial comparative statics need to be performed in trying to understand the 
economic intuition and implications of the model. The theoretical setup extends 
the saving and liquidity constraints model proposed by Deaton (1991) and Carroll 
(1992, 1997) to accommodate search frictions and study the interaction between 
unemployment and consumption dynamics. We build a microeconomic model with 
heterogeneous agents to understand the model’s comparative statics and then ag­
gregate the model explicitly (avoiding the fallacy of composition4 i.e. that what is 
true at the individual is also true at the composite level) to study the interaction 
between aggregate endogenous variables.
As far as the empirical phenomena are concerned, we are interested in seeing 
whether the richer framework that embeds search and savings can account for the 
excess smoothness of consumption growth (i.e. the fact that consumption growth 
is half as volatile as income growth), the excess sensitivity of consumption growth 
to lagged income and unemployment growth and the contemporaneous negative 
correlations between unemployment growth and income and consumption growth.
4Attanasio and Weber (1993) emphasize the importance of aggregation bias when testing eco­
nomic theory. Their work can be viewed as emphasizing the potential problems raised by the 
fallacy of composition and the importance of aggregation.
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Overall, we find that when households can distinguish aggregate from idiosyn­
cratic job destruction shocks (i.e. when there is complete information), the model 
goes some way in explaining the observed patterns but is still poor in replicating 
the actual magnitudes. It nevertheless, does better than the model without any 
search. Introducing incomplete information improves our results. Optimal con­
sumption and search intensity choices maintain the same shape as a function of 
wealth, yet the signal extraction problem does not allow the complete smoothing 
of unemployment shocks. As a result, the contemporaneous correlations between 
unemployment and both consumption and earnings growth become more negative 
than in the complete information model, moving the model’s predictions closer in 
line with the empirical evidence. At the same time, consumption growth becomes 
smoother than earnings growth, and is closer to empirical magnitudes than the 
complete information model. Moreover, excess sensitivity of consumption growth 
to lagged labour income growth continues to persist at the macroeconomic level - 
in line with the empirical findings. However, the sensitivity of consumption growth 
to lagged unemployment growth cannot be robustly replicated in terms of statis­
tical significance, even though the model does seem to approach this prediction 
more closely than the complete information specification. We view these simula­
tion results as encouraging and suggest that future extensions might offer a better 
understanding of the joint comovement between consumption and unemployment 
over the business cycle.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 uncovers a robust negative re­
lationship between unemployment changes and consumption growth. Section 3 
describes the economic environment and discusses the numerical solution method 
and the results for the complete information model. Section 4 analyzes the incom­
plete information model results and section 5 concludes.
2.2. The Consumption-Unemployment Relationship in the Data
In this section we demonstrate a robust negative correlation between consump­
tion growth and unemployment growth5. So far the existing literature has es­
tablished that consumption growth exhibits an excess sensitivity to lagged (or 
predictable) income growth, in contrast with what the permanent income hypoth­
esis predicts. More specifically, consumption should not be expected to respond 
to predictable income changes because permanent income consumers should have 
revised their consumption by the time they knew that their income will change in 
the future. Following similar reasoning, the existence of unemployment risk should 
have made consumers build the appropriate (or at least a sufficient) stock of assets 
so that income fluctuations, due to unemployment spells, should not impact on 
consumption expenditure.
5The results and conclusions do not change qualitatively when trends are removed by an HP 
filter. This holds both for excess sensitivity regressions run with detrended variables and the 
relative smoothness ratios between consumption, unemployment and labor income. We chose 
not to report these results both due to space considerations and because we wanted to relate 
our empirical results with the “excess sensitivity” literature that performs the analysis in growth 
rates.
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In our work, we use U.S. quarterly data6 from 1959:01 to 2002:04. Aggregate 
real per capita consumption Ct , is measured as the sum of consumption of non­
durables (excluding shoes and clothing) and services deflated by the chain-type 
price index of personal consumption expenditures. Real per capita after tax in­
come is denoted as Yt (see Appendix 2 .A for the construction of the series) which 
is also deflated by the same price index. The construction of both series is in 
line with what is proposed by Blinder and Deaton (1985) and Pischke (1995), for 
instance. Table 2.1 summarizes the basic properties of the aggregate data. Specif­
ically, consumption growth is less than half as volatile as labour income growth 
(with the relative standard deviation of consumption to labour income growth be­
ing around 0.4). The latter is another stylized fact that cannot be explained by 
the permanent income hypothesis and is referred to in the literature as the " excess 
smoothness of consumption" (in parallel with the term " excess sensitivity"). Fi­
nally, the unemployment rate growth exhibits higher volatility than labour income 
growth.
6Annual aggregate consumption data do not suffer from many of the problems that plague the 
construction of quarterly data (Wilcox, (1992)). Nevertheless, the relationship between unem­
ployment and consumption is probably strongest even at the monthly frequency given the mean 
duration of unemployment. In section 3 we discuss in detail the choice of frequency for the model, 
which is related with the choice in the data.
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2 .2 .1 . OLS resu lts
Table 2.2 replicates the robust excess sensitivity of consumption growth to lagged 
labour income changes (Panel A), that has been widely documented in the empir­
ical literature as violating the permanent income hypothesis. The point estimate 
from the regression is statistically significant at better than 5 percent level and 
equal to .109. Adding lagged unemployment growth as an additional determinant 
of consumption growth generates the results in Panel B. Both estimates are statisti­
cally significant at better than 5 percent with the unemployment coefficient being 
negative, implying that when the unemployment rate rises, future consumption 
growth is revised downwards. Moreover, the earnings excess sensitivity coefficient 
estimate is adjusted downwards indicating that part of the excess sensitivity to 
labour income could be due to omitting unemployment from the first regression. 
Overall, the OLS  regressions indicate that consumption is sensitive to both labour 
income growth and unemployment changes.
2.2.2. In strum en ta l variables (IV)
2 .2 .2 .1 . Tw o-stage least squares (2SLS). We next check the robustness of 
these correlations by estimating the response of consumption growth to expected 
labour income growth and expected unemployment growth, proxying expected 
values with actual contemporaneous growth rates and using instrumental variables 
techniques to estimate the relevant coefficients. This is essentially reproducing the
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Campbell-Mankiw (1989) results, while extending the analysis to investigate the 
potential empirical impact of unemployment growth on consumption fluctuations.
Table 2.3 uses three different sets of instruments to first reproduce the Campbell- 
Mankiw (1989) results and then investigate the potential effect of expected unem­
ployment on consumption growth. All instruments are lagged for two periods to 
avoid the potential effects of measurement error following an MA(1 ), a common 
route to tackle this problem in the literature. The estimates are highly significant 
and the signs of all coefficients are consistent with the OLS  results. Specifically, 
omitting unemployment growth from the specification generates a coefficient on ex­
pected labour income growth equal to 0.44, while including unemployment growth 
reduces this coefficient to 0.236 and generates a coefficient on expected unemploy­
ment growth equal to —0.04, with both coefficients statistically significant at the 
5% level. These conclusions are robust to alternative instrument specifications 
and are reported in Table 2.3. Moreover, the overidentifying restrictions test (last 
column of Table 2.3) indicates that the model cannot be rejected at better than 5 
percent level of significance.
2 .2 .2 .2 . R obustness to  W eak IVs. Two requirements must be satisfied for IV 
estimation to be unbiased and produce reliable inference: instrument exogeneity 
and instrument relevance. Exogeneity refers to the instruments being orthogonal 
to the error term while relevance dictates that instruments must be “significantly” 
related with the endogenous regressors. Instruments that are weakly correlated 
with what they are instrumenting can produce biased estimates and the first order
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asymptotics may be a poor guide for their actual distribution. As a result, standard 
statistical inference can be unreliable.
We first test all three sets of instruments (with the null being that the in­
struments are weak) using the minimum eigenvalue of the matrix analog of the 
F-statistic (Stock and Yogo, 2003). Both in terms of 2 SL S  bias and 2SLS  size 
distortion, there seems to be no evidence to reject the null of weak IVs7. For this 
reason we compute three fully robust Gaussian tests when instruments are weak. 
These statistics can test for the joint significance of the estimates in the presence 
of weak instruments. This is due to the fact that all statistics have well defined 
asymptotics which do not depend on instrument relevance. In what follows, we 
abstract from explicitly reviewing the tests and refer the reader to the relevant 
papers below.
We start by employing the Anderson — Rubin (A R ) statistic, due to Ander­
son and Rubin (1949) and Moreira (2001). Under the general conditions of weak 
instruments A R  - i  x k / K  (where K  is the number of TV’s) irrespective of in­
strument relevance. Our null hypothesis is that both endogenous variables are 
statistically insignificant. Table 1.4 summarizes the results of the AR  test. With 
four instruments the test suggests that income and unemployment rate growth axe 
jointly significant at the 5 percent level and adding more instruments does not alter 
this conclusion. We next report results from the Kleibergen statistic (Kleibergen, 
2001) which rejects the null for all instrument sets at the 5% level. Moreover, the
7Results not reported for space considerations.
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LR  statistic provides results along these lines rejecting the null at the 5 percent 
level of significance for all instrument sets.
Taken together, these robust inference tests suggest that the estimates are 
jointly significant despite the presence of weak instrumental variables, in contrast 
with the predictions of the permanent income hypothesis.
2.3. The Complete Information M odel
We now proceed by building our basic model. Typically, heterogeneous agent 
consumption models with undiversifiable labour income risk and occasionally bind­
ing liquidity constraints are solved at an annual frequency. Although there is no 
strong a priori reason for this choice, a number of potential explanations do ex­
ist. One possibility arises from the fact that most household level data (like the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics - PSID) collect information on household labour 
income at an annual frequency. Given that in theoretical models the labour in­
come process usually needs to be specified in advance to derive the consumption 
implications, researchers write down and solve models at an annual frequency for 
which labour income dynamics can be based on observed outcomes. This will not 
work in our case for two reasons: firstly because we want to study high frequency 
interactions between consumption and unemployment and secondly - and most im­
portantly - the typical duration of an unemployment spell in the U.S. is roughly a 
quarter. On the other end, even though good unemployment data at the monthly 
frequency exist and are readily available from the BLS, the same does not hold for
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aggregate consumption data. In fact, we know from Wilcox (1992) that aggregate 
consumption data suffer from serious problems even at the quarterly frequency. We 
think that solving a monthly model and time aggregating to a quarterly frequency 
strikes a reasonable compromise between the measurement error inherent in ag­
gregate consumption data and the rich time series dynamics exhibited empirically 
by unemployment (and the theoretical search model) at the monthly frequency. 
Equivalently, we think that studying the implications of a search model at an an­
nual frequency will neither be intuitively appealing nor empirically plausible since 
most households find a new job after an unemployment spell of around one quarter. 
We next detail the specific assumptions we make.
2.3.1. Labour Income
Labour income risk is undiversifiable because of moral hazard and adverse selec­
tion considerations, and it cannot be ignored by households. When employed, we 
assume that labour income of household i follows:
(2.1) Yit = PuUuUt
where
(2.2) Pit = GtPit- iN it
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This process is decomposed into a permanent, Pu, and a transitory idiosyncratic 
component, Uu, and a transitory aggregate component, Ut. We assume that In Uu 
and In Nit are each independent and identically (normally) distributed with zero 
means and variances and respectively. The log of Pit evolves as a random 
walk with a stochastic drift assumed to be common to all individuals (the aggregate 
shock). This stochastic drift, In Gt is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
[jLg and variance ag. In addition to the permanent and transitory idiosyncratic 
components (Pit and Uu), we also assume that there is a transitory aggregate 
component (Ut) in the labour income process that is log-normally distributed with 
mean — 0.5crJ5 and variance crj5. We make this assumption because it is empirically 
defensible for a small variance of a^g (as we assume) and it will be shown to generate 
more smoothness in aggregate consumption through its transitory nature. Given 
these assumptions, the growth in individual labour income follows
(2.3) A In Yit = In Gt +  In Nit +  In Uit -  In Uit- i  +  In Ut -  In Ut-i
where the unconditional mean growth for individual earnings is /ig, and the un­
conditional variance equals (ag +  +  2<rJ +  2<tJ5). Individual earnings growth
in (2.3) has a single Wold representation that is equivalent to the MA(1 ) process 
for individual earnings growth estimated using household level data (Abowd and 
Card [1989], MaCurdy (1981) and Pischke [1995]). Moreover, the individual earn­
ings growth is negatively serially correlated while aggregate shocks have a small
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(statistically insignificant) negative serial correlation with the exact value of this 
correlation depending on o \g. We calibrate these values to match the properties of 
the constructed aggregate labour income process8. Furthermore, aggregate shocks 
are a small component of the total volatility in individual wage growth, consistent 
with the small magnitude of time effects in earnings regressions9.
2.3.2. Job Destruction
There is an exogenous probability that the individual will become unemployed in a 
particular period. We denote this probability by Sit (the job destruction rate) and 
as can be directly observed by the subscripts used it has an idiosyncratic nature. 
During unemployment, the individual has access to unemployment insurance which 
is a constant fraction (a;) of labour income: ubu = ujYit and the duration of this 
benefit is assumed to last as long as the agent is unemployed. Given the lower 
mean wage received in this state, individuals will want to start working so that 
unemployment duration does not persist for long periods in equilibrium.
8In our quarterly data aggregate earnings growth has a first order autocorrelation equal to —0.06 
and the standard deviation equals 0.022 (at an annual frequency). In our baseline specification, 
we use <7ug =  0.005 which implies that the first order autocorrelation in the simulated aggregate
series at a quarterly frequency will be / 4+2a1* =  0 025/4+2*o 0055 =  —'^ -06 while the total
standard deviation of the aggregate shock will be y/0.022 +  2 * 0.0052 =  .021.
9More recently, the variance of earnings shocks has received attention in microeconometric work. 
Specifically, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) argue that the variance of earnings shocks is serially 
correlated while Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) argue that the variance of earnings shocks 
rises in downturns. We abstract from these more complicated specifications in this paper. In 
earlier work, Quah (1990) has shown that decompositions of aggregate labor income shocks exist 
that can explain the observed smoothness of consumption. This might also be true for the 
unemployment process but we do not explore the implications of this assumption in this paper.
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There is an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component to job destruction rates. 
The aggregate component is exogenously assumed to have the same properties as 
the monthly, recently compiled, process from JOLTS (Job Openings and labour 
Turnover Survey) compiled by the Bureau of labour Statistics10. Empirically, the 
job destruction rate is a very persistent process [with an AR(1 ) coefficient of 0.75] 
and we therefore use this specification as an exogenous input in the model. More­
over, job destruction rates are known to be countercyclical in the data (see, for 
example, Hall (2004) and Shimer (2005)). We therefore introduce a negative cor­
relation between the aggregate innovation in the job destruction rate and the ag­
gregate earnings shock but we perform robustness checks by varying these para­
meters. The idiosyncratic component will simply reflect the very high volatility of 
job destruction observed at the individual, relative to the aggregate level (Davis, 
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)).
To closely follow these restrictions, we model the log of the exogenous job 
destruction probability as the sum of an aggregate AR(1 ) component given by
In 8t = x  +  </>(ln St- i  — aO +  In et
10Details can be found at http://www.bls.gOv/jlt/home.htm#overview. We use the total non­
farm separations rate for calibrating the aggregate component of the job destruction rate.
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and an i.i.d idiosyncratic component given by a log-normally distributed variable ( it 
with mean — 0.5cr  ^ and variance a2. The probability of exogenous job destruction 
is then given by11
Sit = exp(ln£t +  lnCit)
The negative correlation between In et and In Gt captures the countercyclicality of 
the aggregate component of the job destruction rate and is denoted by peg while 
the total standard deviation of ln£* is denoted by ct$.
2.3.3. Search Effort
When an individual is unemployed, she will have to decide how much to search in 
order to find a job. In this we follow Lentz (2005) and assume that the probability 
of finding a job in period t +  1 is a positive function of the search effort (su):
(2.4) p ( \s it) = 1 -  exp(-As^)
The latter is strictly increasing and concave in sa and A is now an exogenous 
parameter that controls the offer arrival rate. In a general equilibrium framework 
A would be endogenously determined and would reflect market tightness (as it was 
discussed in the previous chapter).
n The probability is always between zero and one without any further transformation given the 
empirically-baaed choices for the parameters describing job destruction.
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2.3.4. M odel
We consider the problem of a household that maximizes expected intertemporal 
utility
oo
(2.5) M A X {Bust}ZoE0 J 2  ?U(Ct)v(tk»t)
t= 0
subject to
(2 .6 ) Ct + B t < X t
(2.7) X t+i = (1 +  r)B t +  (1 — 7}t+1)Yt+i +  T]t+1LuYt+i
(2 .8 ) Ct > 0
(2.9) B t>  0
(2.10) st > 0
As previously, all variables are in real terms. Bt is the real amount of the 
riskless asset (bonds) which is held between the beginning of period t and the
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beginning of period t + 1. Et is the mathematical expectation operator and /? is 
the discount factor that satisfies 0  < f3 < 1 . U(Ct) is the utihty function at time 
£, X t is cash on hand at the beginning of period t, r is the riskless rate which 
is assumed time-invariant, and Yt is labour income received at the beginning of 
period t. r]t G {0,1} denotes the state of employment at time t, where rj = 1 
stands for unemployed and rj = 0 for employed. Finally u  is the replacement ratio.
The budget constraint (2.6) will hold with equality, given the assumption of 
non-satiation. We assume that the utility function is given by:
(2.11) U(Ct,s t) =  -exp[(l - p ) ( - s t)], p 7^ 1 , P>  1
The utility specification differs from that of the previous chapter and recent em­
pirical studies of search intensity [Lentz (2005), Algan et. al. (2003)] but has been 
used by other authors [for instance, Meghir, Low and Pistaferri (2004)]. We work 
with this specification because it allows the introduction of steady state growth in 
the economy, a feature of preferences that is of pivotal importance in the study 
of business cycle dynamics since developed economies in general (and the U.S. in 
particular) exhibit steady state growth (even though the growth rate might dif­
fer across countries and for the same country over time)12. Given that further 
extensions of the model to study business cycles need to admit balanced growth 
paths, we take the view that the utihty specification needs to be carefully chosen to
12King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) emphasize this point in the context of real business cycle mod­
els. This specification of search in the utility function also ensures that the standard properties 
of the utility function are respected: Uc > 0, Ucc < 0, Us < 0 and US3 > 0.
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both admit balanced growth paths and preserve the precautionary savings motive 
and we feel this utility function is a reasonable choice. In addition, it makes our 
analysis tractable as it allows for the normalization of the problem (see below).
2.3.5. Calibration of Parameters
We consider the unit of analysis to be one month and set @ equal to 1+0 05/ 1 2> and 
the constant real interest rate, r, equal to 0 .0 2 / 1 2 . Carroll (1992) estimates the 
variances of the idiosyncratic shocks using data from the PSID, and our benchmark 
simulations use values close to those: 1 0  percent per quarter for au and 8 / \ / l 2  
percent for an. We set og equal to 0.02/VT2, and fig equal to 0.02/12. Based on 
the monthly JOLTS data, the standard deviation of the logarithm of aggregate job 
destruction is set at 0.06 and the first order autoregressive coefficient (</>) equal to 
0.75 with mean at —3.45. This generates a mean job destruction rate close to 3%, 
consistent with Shimer (2005). There is no clean way of picking the correlation 
between the aggregate earnings shock and the job destruction rate because the 
aggregate earnings data are at a quarterly frequency and we need this parameter 
at a monthly frequency. We therefore experiment and report results for different 
values of this parameter, bearing in mind the range of parameters reported by 
Hall (2004) and Shimer (2005); Hall (2004) uses a strongly countercyclical process 
while Shimer (2005) uses a slightly acychcal one. We therefore use a benchmark 
correlation equal to —0.7 and also report results for a correlation equal to zero.
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Finally, we set the replacement rate during unemployment equal to 60% (but we 
also report results for the 50% case).
We pick two parameters to generate two predictions from the model. Specifi­
cally, we pick the benchmark coefficient of relative risk aversion so that consump­
tion during unemployment is on average 7 —10 percent lower than during employ­
ment (consistent with Gruber (1997)). Moreover, because the model is supposed 
to capture the behavior of people facing unemployment shocks (that is, relatively 
poorer people in the economy), we do not want high asset accumulation. A low co­
efficient of relative risk aversion achieves both goals, and we set p — 1 .2  to achieve 
these aims. Moreover, we adjust the parameter through which search intensity 
affects the probability of finding a job when unemployed (A) to generate in sim­
ulated data an unemployment rate close to 6  percent and an average probability 
of finding employment after one month of around 50 percent [consistent with data 
from the BLS, as reported by Shimer (2005)]. This results in a value for A of 1.0.
2.3.6. Solution M ethod
We generalize the Deaton (1991) solution to allow for search during the unem­
ployment state by deriving three Euler equations associated with the three control 
variables. Letting Uc denote the marginal utihty of consumption and V e, V u the
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value of being employed and unemployed respectively, the three Euler equations 
are given by (see Appendix 2 .B for further details)13:
(2 .12)
Uc{Ctt) =  M A X {U c (Xit), p (l  +  r )£ t [(l -  8it+1)Uc {Ctt+1) +  <WiUc(C3+1)]}
Uc(C%) = M AX{U c (Xit),/3(l + r M \ s it)EtUo(C?t+1)
(2-13) +(1 -  n { \sa))EtUc {Ctt+1)}}
and
(2.14) U.(C£) = fin'(\Sit)Et\V‘t+l -  V3VJ
The three Euler equations were discusses extensively in the previous chapter, 
hence no further comments will be added here.
Given the non-stationary process followed by labour income, we normalize as­
set holdings and cash on hand by the permanent component of earnings Pa, de­
noting the normalized variables by lower case letters (Carroll, 1992)14. Defining
13We let Et denote the expectation conditional on information at time t but we exclude the 
uncertainty about the next period employment status in this notation to illustrate how the Euler 
equations generalize explicitly from the case where the agent remains always employed.
14The ability to normalize this specification of utility and derive aggregate implications is vital 
if the business cycle properties of the model axe to be further studied in richer settings.
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Zt+i — taking advantage of the homogeneity of degree (—p) of marginal util­
ity implied by CRRA preferences, and using the identity c^ + 1  =  xu+i — bft+1 (see 
Appendix 2 .B for the proposed numerical algorithm), we have
(2.15)
Uc(xit -  6&) =  M A X{U c(xit),(3( 1 +  r)EtZ " '[ ( l  -  6t+1)Uc(clt+1) +  6t+lUc(c“t+1)]} 
Uc(xit -  &«) = M AX{U c(xit),p( 1 +  r)EtZ;+PM \ s it)Uc{clt+i)
(2-16) + ( l - / z ( A ^ ) ) ^ c ( 4 +1)]}
and
Us(xit -  6S) =  W { \ s it)Et{Z]^[V?t+i ~  Vff+J]}
The normalized state variable x  evolves differently according to whether the indi­
vidual is unemployed or not in the current period and the next. The four different 
possibilities are:
(2-17) =  (4(1 +  r)Zr+\  +  Ut+1Uit+1
(2-18) x^+1 =  (4(1 +  r)Z t~+\  +  coUt+1Uit+1
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(2.19)
(2.20) f e ^ l + r ^ + C / m ^ + i
2.3.7. Benchmark Model Results
The consumption policy functions are plotted in figure 2.1 and the search inten­
sity (expressed as the probability of finding a job when unemployed) in figure 2 .2 . 
Saving is zero when the constraints are binding and increases with cash on hand 
beyond a certain point generating a concave consumption function. The relevant 
range of the consumption functions for the unemployed is around mean earnings 
during employment (one) and in that region either the liquidity constraint is bind­
ing or consumption is lower than consumption during employment (figure 2 .1 ). 
This is corroborated from the simulation results reported later.
Search intensity is increasing in wealth for low values of cash on hand and 
decreases beyond a certain level of cash on hand (figure 2 .2 ). As wealth increases, 
the expected value of being employed relative to being unemployed shrinks (the 
difference in the expected value functions on the right hand side in the third 
Euler equation, (2.14)). Thus, search incentives are decreasing in wealth beyond 
a certain level and richer agents can afford longer unemployment spells. For the
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levels of wealth that the liquidity constraint is binding, on the other hand, the 
marginal utility of consumption is very high and the only dimension/margin of 
precautionary saving activity remains the intensity of search. As a result, search 
intensity increases over low wealth levels (specifically, over wealth levels that the 
liquidity constraint remains binding during the unemployment state) and decreases 
beyond that level of cash on hand that generates positive saving. Moreover, in 
the presence of persistent job destruction shocks, search intensity depends on the 
current realization of job destruction. A high job destruction realization that is 
expected to persist for a number of periods reduces the attactiveness of finding a 
job and generates a lower search intensity for a given level of cash on hand (figure 
2 .2).
Figure 2.3 illustrates what happens when the unemployment insurance system 
becomes more generous by increasing the replacement ratio from 0.6 to 0.8. Search 
intensity decreases for a given level of cash on hand, while maintaining the same 
non-monotonic shape as a function of wealth.
2.3.8. Time Series Analysis
We simulate the model at a monthly frequency and report both individual and 
aggregate statistics. Individual statistics are reported at a monthly frequency to 
understand the predictions of the microeconomic model for consumer behavior.
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Aggregate statistics, on the other hand, will be compared to the quarterly fre­
quency stylized facts that were reported earlier. We therefore time-aggregate indi­
vidual statistics to a quarterly frequency by either adding up monthly values (for 
consumption and earnings, for instance) or picking the third value in the monthly 
simulations to correspond to the quarter (in the case of unemployment for exam­
ple). The procedure is done over the number of monthly frequency observations 
in the sample, with a certain number of initial simulations (1 0 0 ) discarded from 
the statistics to allow the economy to reach its steady state (this typically takes 
place quickly, after around 20 — 30 months). Simulations are performed over 2 0 0 0  
individuals and are averaged over 1 0 0  Monte Carlo draws reducing substantially 
simulation bias in the reported statistics.
2.3.8.1. Individual Statistics. Table 2.5 produces average time series statis­
tics from tracking different individual histories over time. The first column re­
produces results for the case without any unemployment risk (the Deaton (1991) 
model) . 15 Impatient households consume on average their mean labour income 
and save around 23% of their mean earnings. The standard deviation of individual 
consumption growth is substantially lower than the standard deviation of labour 
income growth (0.037 and 0.144 respectively) as households can buffer very well 
their labour income shocks with a small amount of savings. This shows that even
15The results are very similar to the Carroll (1997) model in this column but we impose the 
constraint explicitly which might lead to some differences on the level of the consumption function 
depending on expected benefits during unemployment.
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the model without search and unemployment risk can generate excess consumption 
smoothness at the microeconomic level
Comparing our benchmark specification to these results, we note that saving 
rises substantially in the presence of unemployment risk but the mean level of con­
sumption is only 2.4% lower relative to the no-unemployment case. Consumption 
drops when moving from employment to unemployment and the drop is around 
8 %: the choice of risk aversion coefficient was guided to generate such a drop, con­
sistent with the empirical results in Gruber (1997). Unconditional labour income 
growth becomes more volatile reflecting the lower benefits (wages) received during 
unemployment spells and the standard deviation of consumption growth also rises 
as a result but is still substantially smoother than labour income growth.
This substantial consumption smoothing is achieved by high accumulation of 
bonds (around a month’s mean earnings during the employment state) on one 
hand and search effort on the other. The latter can ensure that the unemployment 
spell will not last for long periods of time and, therefore allows the individual 
to use more of her savings to smooth consumption effectively (of course, saving is 
higher when employed relative to when unemployed, reflecting the desire to smooth 
consumption across states). In effect, the individual is able to control partially 
how long she will stay unemployed and therefore can control more effectively the 
consumption-transition from the employment to the unemployment state.
Eliminating transitory aggregate shock uncertainty (setting aug = 0) leaves al­
most unaltered the microeconomic implications of the model since aggregate shocks
93
make up a small component of the total uncertainty faced by the household, and 
thus have a negligible impact on results. As a result, the microeconomic implica­
tions of the model remain almost unchanged by this. Moreover, the same conclu­
sion for the same reason arises when the correlation between aggregate shocks and 
job destruction shocks is set equal to zero. Reducing the unemployment benefit, 
on the other hand, generates higher unconditional saving (from 0.946 to 1.24), 
while also increasing the search intensity dining unemployment from 0.7 to 0.79 
implying an increase in the probability of exiting unemployment within a month 
from 50.4% to 54.7%. Higher saving and search intensity imply that the higher 
labour income uncertainty does not translate to higher consumption uncertainty, 
generating a very smooth consumption growth series.
2 .3.8.2. A ggregate S ta tistics. Table 2.6 reports the statistics from averaging 
individual consumption decisions in the cross section and then computing the time 
series statistics implied by the model at a quarterly frequency to be compared to 
the quarterly data. Here, we are interested in two things: firstly, we want to see 
the workings of the model on the aggregate level and secondly we are interested 
in identifying whether the search-saving framework can account for the excess 
smoothness and excess sensitivity of consumption growth at the macro level.
The first column reports the results from aggregating the Deaton (1991) model. 
Individual consumption smoothing does not survive the aggregation procedure 
since what is important for aggregate statistics is the reaction to the aggregate 
shock, not the smoothing of individual transitory shocks. The relative smoothness
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ratio (defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of consumption to earnings 
growth) is 0 .8 6 , implying that some consumption smoothing does survive the ag­
gregation procedure, but not to the extent that it can replicate the magnitudes 
observed in the data16. More specifically, permanent shocks axe not smoothed 
and since aggregate shocks are mostly permanent this translates into a volatile 
consumption growth series at the macro level.
Almost, all the search models generate a smoother aggregate consumption 
growth series, a direct result of the higher saving taking place to buffer unem­
ployment shocks in addition to labour income fluctuations and the search effort. 
Specifically, the relative smoothness ratio (s.d. of consumption growth relative to 
s.d. of earnings growth) varies from 0.72 to 0.87, with the more plausible para- 
meterizations generating a figure around 0.72. Consumption growth is therefore 
smoother than the standard buffer stock saving model but not as smooth as in the 
data, indicating that incorporating unemployment risk goes - at least - some way 
in explaining the observed patterns.
The excess sensitivity coefficient on labour income is statistically significant 
and of a magnitude comparable to the data. The main reasons for this positive 
correlation are firstly related to the fact that we have assumed a small transitory
16In the annual frequency model, the relative smoothness ratio is closer to one. In the monthly 
model this is not the case because the ratio of transitory to permanent shock variances is much 
higher than in the annual model implying higher individual saving rates and higher individual 
consumption smoothing, some of which survives the aggregation procedure.
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component to aggregate labour income shocks, that makes consumption of im­
patient and liquidity constrained individuals to respond to lagged income growth 
and secondly, the presence of unemployment which in effect makes income shocks 
due to unemployment to be transitory. When individuals are employed however, 
this positive correlation is re-enforced by the presence of search effort. The reason 
is that impatient employed consumers are more likely to consume out of current 
temporary income increases, despite the possibility of future unemployment risk, 
because they can protect more effectively from the latter by raising their search 
effort during the unemployment spell. On the other hand however, the model as 
it stands, seems incapable of replicating the sensitivity to lagged unemployment 
growth as the latter is shown to be statistically insignificant in the simulations. 
Finally, the correlation between unemployment growth and both consumption and 
earnings growth is negative and statistically significant but not as high in absolute 
value as that observed in the data.
An interesting observation arises from the comparative statics involving the 
aggregate quantities: setting the transitory aggregate shock standard deviation 
equal to zero (aug — 0 ) and the correlation between job destruction and the ag­
gregate earnings shock equal to zero (peg = 0). The microeconomic implications of 
either of these changes were almost identical to the benchmark simulations in table
2.5. Now, however, the absence of a transitory aggregate shock reduces the con­
sumption smoothing present in the model as aggregate shocks axe more permanent
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(relative smoothness rises from 0.72 to 0.87). Perhaps equivalently, the contem­
poraneous correlation between consumption and labour income growth rises from 
0.80 to 0.94, as consumption reacts more to the presence of a higher degree of per­
manent shocks. In the absence of negative correlation between job destruction and 
earnings shocks, on the other hand, the correlation between consumption growth 
and unemployment growth is statistically insignificant from zero (contrary to the 
empirical evidence) illustrating the importance of this correlation in accounting for 
the empirical evidence.
A more general point can also be made from these comparative statics. Even 
though the magnitude of these aggregate shocks is small relative to the total uncer­
tainty faced by the household, understanding aggregate fluctuations does require 
experimenting with, and including, aggregate shocks in the microeconomic model: 
microeconomic implications alone may not be informative about the aggregate 
implications of a particular model.
Overall, we conclude that incorporating unemployment risk does go some way 
in explaining the smoothness of consumption growth that we observe in the data 
but still the smoothness ratio is higher than the empirical one. At the same 
time, the assumption of transitory aggregate income shocks together with the 
presence of search effort can improve the model’s predictions as far as the excess 
sensitivity of consumption to lagged income growth is concerned. However, the 
model does not seem capable of accounting for the excess sensitivity with respect 
to lagged unemployment growth while the correlations between the latter and
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current consumption and income growth are quite lower in absolute value than the 
ones we find in the data.
2.4. Incomplete Information Model
So far, the arrival of a job destruction shock was due to aggregate and idio­
syncratic reasons and households were able to distinguish between them. If, for 
example, there was an aggregate income shock that was automatically translated 
into an aggregate job destruction shock - due to the negative correlation we have 
assumed - the individual was able to observe the true source of job destruction vari­
ation and correctly attribute it to the aggregate income shock. We now investigate 
the implications of being unable to distinguish between aggregate and idiosyncratic 
job destruction shocks following the same methodology as in the previous section. 
The original idea comes from the classic 1973 Lucas signal extraction model with 
producers unable to distinguish movements in aggregate prices and wages from 
individual ones. The closest precursors of this assumption in the context of con­
sumption models can be found in various forms in Deaton (1991), Pischke (1995) 
and Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001), in the context of earnings shocks. The 
idea is simple. Given that economy-wide shocks account for a very small frac­
tion of the variance in individual earnings growth [Pischke (1995), for instance], 
households may have little incentive to distinguish aggregate from idiosyncratic 
shocks to their earnings. Pischke (1995) shows that informational assumptions 
can have important effects on aggregate consumption when individual households
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behave according to the permanent income hypothesis while Deaton (1991) and 
Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001) illustrate the importance of this assumption in 
the context of variants of buffer stock saving models. Nevertheless, experimenting 
with this assumption in the context of the current model reveals a substantial im­
pact on saving behavior due to the presence of the unemployment state: failure 
to distinguish aggregate from idiosyncratic shocks actually generates a substantial 
increase in saving to smooth consumption. We therefore introduce incomplete in­
formation in the ability of the household to understand whether the unemployment 
state has arrived due to an aggregate or an idiosyncratic job destruction shock. We 
later show that this assumption does not affect the microeconomic predictions of 
the model but can have substantially different implications for aggregate dynamics 
from the complete information model.
There are some other similar (but different) assumptions about, information. 
Goodfriend (1992) assumes that information about the macroeconomy arrives with 
a lag, while Gabaix and Laibson (2001) and Reis (2003) assume that individuals 
respond to the aggregate shocks infrequently, and this may happen when aggregate 
shocks have cumulated to an amount that cannot be optimally ignored. In our 
setup, the individual optimally chooses to not spend time and effort to separate 
the aggregate from the idiosyncratic job destruction shocks because aggregate job 
destruction makes up a very small component of total idiosyncratic job destruction. 
This assumption can also be motivated based on recent work by Sims (2003) as
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coining from “limited information-processing capacity” on the part of rational 
individuals (Sims (2003), p. 6 6 6 ).
2.4.1. Job Destruction
If aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks cannot be separated by the individual, the 
assumptions about the job destruction process we have made so far imply that 
the individual will base decisions on an AR(1 ) that has the same autocovariance 
generating function as the true process. Specifically, the true process is
(2 .2 1 ) InSt + \n ( it = x +  0 (lnSt- i  -  fj) +  Inet +  InCit 
but the household will be observing
(2 .2 2 ) In qi t = n + ip In qit_ i +  In pit
where k  is a constant and Inpit a zero-mean white noise process with variance a 
How are the three parameters {fi, ip, o^} pinned down? They are determined by 
matching the mean, variance and first order autocovariance implied by the actual 
earnings process (2 .2 1 ) with the one perceived by the individual given by (2 .2 2 ). 
The variance of the actual job destruction process is cr| +  cr^  and this has to equal
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the variance of the perceived job destruction process, a2. To infer ip, we match the 
first order autocovariance between the actual and the perceived process to get that
t p a *  =  < p a j
so that
,/, = M  = ^
<j \ <j \ + <j \
Given that we have set values for the two variances a2 and a2 and for the autore­
gressive parameter <j> already, we can infer both ip and a2. It is useful to note that 
incomplete information as a2 increases, the idiosyncratic component in the job de­
struction process becomes more important and therefore incomplete information 
is less severe for individuals. In the limit, the coefficient ip will tend to zero as a2 
tends to infinity17.
17In the benchmark calibration the correlation between the job destruction rate and aggregate 
labor income growth is non-zero. According to the true earnings process, we know that
C O v (8 t , Ain Yit) =  <JSg =  Peg^S^g
Matching this with the covariance between the perceived job destruction rate and the actual 
labor income process implies that the perceived correlation between the job destruction rate and 
the innovation in aggregate labor income is given by
Pega £
which again is distorted relative to the truth by the amount of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the 
job destruction process.
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2.4.2. Benchmark M odel Results
The model is solved with a similar set of Euler equations as in the complete in­
formation case. The consumption policy functions are similar in shape and not 
very different in level as the ones plotted in figure 2 . 1  (the complete information 
case). Consumption equals cash on hand when the liquidity constraint is bind­
ing and increases with cash on hand beyond a certain point generating a concave 
consumption function.
Search intensity (expressed as the probability of finding a job when unem­
ployed) is plotted in figure 2.4. Search intensity is increasing in wealth for low 
values of cash on hand and decreases beyond a certain level of cash on hand, 
having the same shape as in the complete information model. The key difference 
from figure 2 . 2  (the complete information case) is that the differences across job 
destruction states are not visible any more. The signal extraction problem is re­
sponsible for this result: when the job destruction process is correctly attributed 
to the true AR(1) process, the search profile will crucially depend on it. However, 
when agents believe that the process is governed by idiosyncratic shocks then the 
autoregressive parameter of the perceived job destruction process is very close to 
zero and this makes the policy function very similar to what would result from a a 
simple i.i.d. shock. This is intuitive: given the larger variance of the idiosyncratic 
relative to the aggregate destruction shock, the perceived process inherits mostly
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the process associated with the idiosyncratic i.i.d. shock. Nevertheless, the level 
of search, on average, is very similar across the two different information cases.
2.4.3. T im e Series Analysis
2.4.3.I. Indiv idual S tatistics. Table 2.7 produces average time series statistics 
from tracking different individual histories over time. Comparing the benchmark 
complete information specification to the benchmark incomplete information re­
sults, we note the striking similarity in implications for the microeconomic problem 
between the two radically different information structures. Almost all entries are 
exactly identical and the same is also true for the no-transitory aggregate vari­
ance case (aug — 0), the lower unemployment insurance model (u = 0.5) and the 
case where the correlation between job destruction and aggregate earnings shocks 
is zero. The reason for these results comes from the fact that the aggregate job 
destruction shock is a very small component of total idiosyncratic job destruction 
uncertainty, implying that carefully basing decisions on the aggregate component 
does not substantially affect behavior at the microeconomic level.
The only (small) differences appear when comparing the low idiosyncratic job 
destruction variance case (<j  ^ =  0.1). This is so because the signal extraction 
problem is actually larger when the aggregate component of job destruction is more 
prominent - in relative terms - in the total job destruction variance. As a result, 
there are stronger differences between the complete and incomplete information 
cases here but still the differences are very small in magnitude.
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2 .4.3 .2 . A ggregate S tatistics. So far we established that there are extremely 
small differences at the microeconomic level driven by the fact that the aggregate 
component of the job destruction shock is usually small. We now turn to the 
aggregate implications of our informational assumptions. Table 2.8 reports the 
incomplete information results. Comparing the benchmark results across complete 
(Table 2.6) and incomplete information (Table 2.8) models, we note the following;
First, there is a greater degree of consumption smoothing taking place in the 
incomplete information model with relative smoothness falling from 0.72 to 0.60 
bringing the model’s prediction closer in line with the empirical data. As already 
stated, what matters for aggregation are the aggregate shocks. The aggregate 
component of the job destruction shock however, is mistakenly attributed to idio­
syncratic nature. The latter is attempted to be smoothed by agents (unwittingly) 
through savings and therefore does not wash out on the aggregate. Once again, the 
presence of search effort facilitates the smoothing of transition; when faced with a 
(perceived) idiosyncratic negative shock and becomes unemployed, an agent would 
like to use her savings - if available - to smooth what she believes is a temporary 
change. The fact that she can search and affect the probability or re-employment 
implies that she can use more of her savings and thus maintain a smoother con­
sumption profile.
Second, the correlation between consumption and earnings growth is unchanged 
but there is a substantial increase - in absolute value - in the correlation be­
tween both consumption and unemployment growth (from —0.16 to —0.36) and
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between earnings and unemployment growth (from —0.28 to —0.62). The reason 
that consumption growth is now more negatively related to unemployment growth 
is straightforward: Agents try to adjust their savings (and thus consumption) due 
to the idiosyncratic shock that they think has hit them. Along the same lines, 
search effort responds more and as a result there is a greater negative correlation 
between unemployment and income growth.
Third, the excess sensitivity coefficient on lagged labour income is slightly 
higher (from 0 . 1 2  to 0.18) while the lagged unemployment growth coefficient is 
negative and approaches the 1 0 % level of statistical significance. As already men­
tioned, savings and search effort respond by more to the mistakenly perceived 
idiosyncratic job destruction shock and as a result, next period’s consumption 
growth becomes more sensitive to unemployment changes. Still however, this link 
is not strong enough to generate a very robust statistical relationship.
These conclusions are robust to different perturbations of the structural pa­
rameters as table 2.8 illustrates. We conclude that the incomplete information, 
infinite horizon, partial equilibrium model goes some way towards explaining some 
of the observed time series regularities but further work is needed to understand 
the implications of the model for unemployment dynamics over the business cycle 
and its joint determination with consumption.
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2.5. Conclusion
This chapter documents that the excess sensitivity of consumption growth to 
lagged (expected) labour income growth conceals a robust negative sensitivity of 
consumption growth to lagged (expected) unemployment growth. Incorporating 
search frictions in a heterogeneous agent, precautionary savings model and aggre­
gating individual life histories cannot fully replicate the aggregate stylized facts. 
Nevertheless, introducing incomplete information (defined as the inability to dis­
tinguish between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks) delivers time series predic­
tions that are relatively consistent with the macroeconomic empirical evidence 
but further work is needed to understand the joint determination of consumption 
and unemployment over the business cycle. Future work can, for instance, ex­
tend the model in general equilibrium using variants of the methodology suggested 
by Krusell and Smith (1998) and/or incorporate preferences that do not allow 
for the perfect planning assumed by exponential discounting (Laibson (1997) or 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)), so that the unemployment shock does generate a 
larger negative impact on consumption.
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Appendix 2. A: Data construction
This appendix gives data details for our aggregate variables.
Y  denotes after tax per capita labour income deflated by the consumption of 
nondurables and services deflator.
C denotes per capita consumption of nondurables and services (excluding shoes 
and clothing) deflated in the same way.
To construct Y  we use the following series from the Bureau of Economic Analy­
sis (BEA):
Add wage income (WGSAL) and other labour income (OTHLAB) and subtract 
personal contributions for social insurance (CONTRIB). We do not add in trans­
fer payments because, throughout the sample, these data are heavily influenced by 
retroactive payments and massive one-time increments, as well as seasonal adjust­
ment problems. To determine the taxes paid on this labour income, we construct 
T  AO LAB = — - , where PERSINC is the total disposable personal 
income (that is, wages, rent, interest and dividends). TAOLAB is thus the share 
of labour income in total disposable income. After tax labour income is then
A T LAB IN C  = W G SAL  +  O TH LAB -  C O N T R IB  -  TA O LAB  * T A X  PAY,
where T A X  P A Y  is defined as personal tax and nontax payments from the national 
income and product accounts. We multiply proprietors’ income by TAO LAB
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(new variable called P RO PIN C ) and construct the share of proprietors’ labour 
income in total disposable income as TAO PRO P = ^ rsi^  5 so after tax 
proprietors’ income is
A T P R O P IN C  = P R O P IN C  -  TAO PRO P  * T A X  P A Y  
and the real after tax per capita series used in the paper follows as
(AT L A B I N C  +  A T P RO PIN C )
~  (POP  * JC)
where POP  is the population series and JC  is the personal consumption chain
type deflator.
To obtain the unemployment series ut, we use monthly data from the Bureau 
of labour Statistics and pick each third value to build the quarterly series. Real 
interest rates are constructed as nominal 3-month Treasury Bill rates minus actual 
inflation based on the Consumer Price Index.
Appendix 2.B: Euler Equations and Numerical 
Solution Method
There are two value functions associated with the utility cost model depending 
on employment status (Ve,V u). They are determined recursively according to
(2.B.1)
Vte{X«) = M A X BeU(Xit -  B£) +  !3Et[(l ~  « w ) K + i f e i )  +  St+i V ^ { X iM )\
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and
V7(X() =  M A X BXt'SilU{Xi t -  B?t)v(sit) (2 .B.2 )
+/3Et[n(sit)Vt\ 1(Xit+1) +  (1 -  / iM W iP f c + i ) ]
Combining the first order necessary condition with respect to B^t, the two envelope 
conditions {^x~t =  Uc(Cft) and =  Uc(C^t)} and the possibility of a binding 
liquidity constraint, we can derive the first two Euler equations given by (2.15) 
and (2.16). The third Euler equation can be derived by differentiating (2.B.2) 
and imposing the possibility of a binding constraint on search intensity. The nor­
malization by the growing components is done to make the model stationary and 
allow balanced growth paths. This utilizes the fact that the value functions are 
homogeneous of degree ( 1  — p), a property that they inherit from the CRRA utility 
function.
Two sufficient conditions for the individual Euler equations to define a contrac­
tion mapping are the conditions in Theorem 1 of Deaton and Laroque (1992) for 
a mathematically identical model of commodity prices (j3 =  y^ ):
(2.B.3) T T d EtZr+Pi < 1
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If this condition holds, there will exist a unique set of optimum policies satisfying 
the three Euler equations. We next simplify these conditions to gain an intuitive 
understanding of the economics of the problem. Given that Zt+1 =  Gt+iNt+i, 
with {N }  being log normally distributed, we have Et(Gt+iNt+i)~p = exp(—ppg -f 
p-^ - )  * exp{-p p n +  Then
S T T 3 Z«  *  E‘W iE’z‘« |2 B -4)
1 +  r P2<t5 p V 2
=  j + d  * exp(_p/is +  ~2 * exp _^ w " +  ~2~^
Taking logs of the two conditions and using the approximation log(l +  x) «  x
for small x , (2.B.3) becomes
(2.B.5) T—^  +  |((72 +  o-2) <
which is the condition derived by Deaton (1991) with p,n = 0 and is the same 
condition as in Carroll (1997) where pn is non-zero.
The condition can be satisfied for high pg or d. First, a high expected earnings 
growth profile (as measured by pg) guarantees that the individual will not want 
to accumulate an infinite amount bonds but would rather borrow now, expecting 
earnings to increase in the future. Second, if the rate of time preference exceeds 
the expected stock return, more risk averse (higher p) individuals will not satisfy 
the convergence conditions.
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The single state variable (normalized cash on hand, xt = is discretized into 
say (1 0 0 ) grid points with more points at lower values of cash on hand where the 
value function is more curved and the policy functions have a kink. Given that 
the value functions converge, we can solve simultaneously the three functional 
equations for the three policy functions. Note that the value functions also need to 
be computed and updated until convergence when computing the search intensity 
function. Interpolations along the single continuous state variable are performed 
using cubic spline interpolation and the upper bound of cash on hand is found 
by a trial and error method that ensures simulated liquid assets never exceed the 
chosen upper bound for cash on hand.
The incomplete information model is solved in a similar manner.
I l l
Table 2.1
Properties of Aggregate Time Series U.S. Data 
Quarterly Frequency
1959:01 - 2002:04
Time Series s.d. First Autoc.
A Ct .44 .336
Ay* i .i -.082
A Ut 5.98 .393
Contemporaneous Correlations
Corr(ACt,A Y t) .489
Corr{ACu A ut) - .4 2 2
Corr{AYu Aut) - .432
Notes to Table 2.1: Y  denotes real, after tax, per capita labour income, C denotes 
real, per capita consumption of nondurables and services (excluding shoes and clothing) 
and u denotes the unemployment rate. A  is used to denote the growth rate in a variable. 
Details for the construction of these variables can be found in Appendix 2.A. Bold 
variables denote statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 2.2
Excess Sensitivity of Consumption Growth to 
labour Income Growth and Unemployment Growth
1959:01 - 2002:04 
OLS  estimates
Panel A
Dependent variable 
A Ct
Regressor
A ^t-i
Adj.R 2
Panel B
.109*
(.036)
.077
Dependent variable Regressors Adj.R2
A Ct A lf-i A?/f_i
.077* -.014* 
(.031) (.004)
. 1 0 2
Notes to Table 2 .2 : Y  denotes real, after tax, per capita labour income, C  denotes 
real, per capita consumption of nondurables and services (excluding shoes and clothing) 
and u denotes the unemployment rate. A is used to denote the growth rate in a variable. 
Details for the construction of these variables can be found in Appendix 2 .A.* denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level. Standard errors for the OLS estimates are given 
in parentheses.
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Table 2.3 IV  Estimates
Panel A
Dependent Variable IV s Regressors Jstat.
AC* 1 st set a y ; A ut
.441* — . 0 0 2
(.137) —
.236* -.041* .008
(.1 1 0 ) (.018)
Panel B
Dependent Variable IV s Regressors Jstat.
ACt 2 nd set a y ; A ut
.420* — . 0 2 0
(.1 2 1 ) —
.231* -.039* .028
(.098) (.016)
Panel C
Dependent Variable IV s Regressors Jstat.
ACt 3rd set AV, A ut
.323* — .048
(.070) —
.185* -.032* .030
(.082) (.015)
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Notes to Table 2.3: Y  denotes real, after tax, per capita labor income, C  denotes 
real, per capita consumption of nondurables and services (excluding shoes and clothing), 
u denotes the unemployment rate and r is the real short term interest rate defined as 
the difference between the nominal three month U.S. Treaury Bill rate and inflation 
(constructed from the CPI). Data range: 1959:01 - 2002:04, quarterly. A  is used to 
denote the growth rate in a variable. Details for the construction of these variables can 
be found in Appendix 2 .A. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and standard 
errors are given in parentheses. The first set of instruments is: A Y t~2 , A Y t s ,  A u t~ 2 , 
A u t- s .  The second set of instruments is the first set plus ln(C t_2 / l /t - 2 )) ln(C t—3 / ^ —3 ) 
and the third set of instruments is the second set plus rt - 2 , ^ - 3 .For the regressions 
without A  Ut the respective instrument sets do not include A ut~2 , A u t-3 .
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Table 2.4
Fully Robust Inference with Weak Instruments
Test 1st set of IV s 2nd set of IV s 3rd set of IV s
A-R 8 .0 2 ** 7.03** 6.97**
Critical Values (10%,5%) (1.94,2.37) (1.77, 2.09) (1.67, 1.94)
Kleibergen 16.1** 12.4* 25.6**
Critical Values (10%,5%) (7.78, 9.49) (10.64, 12.59) (13.36, 15.51)
Moreira (LR) 23.5** 23.8** 39.7**
Critical Values (5%) (4.20) (4.73) (4.73)
Notes to Table 2.4: Different tests of the null that the IV s  are weak in the regressions 
of Table 2.3. * (**) denotes that Hq is rejected at 10% (5%). Numbers in parentheses 
indicate the critical values of the respective statistics at the 10% and 5% level of sta­
tistical significance respectively. The first set of instruments is: AYt- 2 , AYt-s, A ut- 2 , 
A u t- 3 . The second set of instruments is the first set plus ln(C t_ 2 /L t - 2 )> ln(C t—3 / ^ —3 ) 
and the third set of instruments is the second set plus r t~2 , rt~ 3 . The critical values 
for the LR  test are reproduced from Moreira (2003) and refer only to 5% significance. 
Moreira does not report any values for the case of six and eight exogenous variables but 
since the statistic is increasing in the number of instruments we report the threshold for 
10 IVs.
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Table 2.5
Complete Information (Individual Statistics) - monthly frequency
Variable DC Bench 1! o =  0 . 1 u  = .5 fh II o
Mean c 1 . 0 0 .976 .976 .976 .973 .976
Mean ce .982 .982 .982 .977 .982
Mean cu .902 .902 .902 .904 .902
Mean b .226 .946 .946 .946 1.24 .946
Median b .224 .957 .958 .957 1.27 .957
Mean be .980 .981 .980 1.28 .980
Mean bu .453 .453 .453 .623 .453
Mean s .70 .699 .70 .79 .70
cr(A Cit) .037 .043 .043 .043 .046 .043
v(A Yit) .144 .191 .191 .191 .223 .191
Prob Exit Un (%) 50.4 50.4 50.4 54.7 50.4
Drop in c (%) 8.15 8.14 8.15 7.45 8.16
Drop in b (%) 53.8 53.8 53.8 51.3 53.8
Notes to Table 2.5: All simulations are performed at a monthly frequency to capture 
high frequency unemployment dynamics. DC refers to the model without unemployment 
risk which is identical to Deaton (1991) and similar to Carroll (1997), except for the 
frequency in decision making. For the benchmark specification, /3 =  1 —-jj, r =  .02 /12 , 
u  =  0.6, fig =  .02 /12 , o u =  0.1, <7g =  .0 2 / \ / l2 ,  crug — 0.005, o n  =  .0 8 /> /l2 , 
4> =  0.75, O'  ^ =  0.2, p eg — —0.7, os =  0.06 and >c =  —3.45. Lower case variables
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are normalized by the permanent component of individual labour income. A is chosen 
so that the mean probability of finding employment after one month is around 50%. 
This generates a value for A =  1. The risk aversion coefficient is chosen to generate a 
drop in consumption of around 8 % in mean consumption from the employment to the 
unemployment state generating p  =  1.2. The last two rows refer to the drop in mean 
normalized consumption and savings from an employment to an unemployment state. 
The statistics are computed over 172*3 periods over 2000 individuals and averaged over 
1 0 0  simulation draws.
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Table 2.6
Complete Information Model (Aggregate Statistics) - quarterly frequency
Variable DC Bench £ II o
i—
1
oIIb u = .5 Pe9 = °
Mean A Ct .005 .005 .005 .005 .005 .005
<r(A Ct) .008 .008 .008 .008 .008 .008
Mean A Yt .005 .005 .005 .005 .005 .005
a(A  Yt) .0 1 .016 .0 1 .0 1 .0 1 1 .0 1
a(ACt)/a (A Y t) .862 .718 .87 .80 .77 .80
Corr(ACt, AYt) .91 .80 .94 .87 . 8 6 . 8 6
Carr{ACt,AUt) - .1 6 - .1 6 - .1 6 -.1 6 - . 0 1
Corr(AYt,AU t) - .2 8 - .3 4 - .3 2 - .3 4 - .1 8
Sensitivity (A>*_i) .16 . 1 2 .17 .14 .14 .15
S.E. (A Y ,.,) .06 .06 .07 .06 .06 .06
Sensitivity (AUt~i) - . 0 0 2 .0 0 1 - . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 1
S.E. (AUt-!) .004 . 0 0 2 .004 .004 .004
Mean Un (%) 6.04 6.04 6.04 5.56 6.04
Notes to Table 2.6: See notes to Table 2.5. For this table, cross sectional averages 
are first taken and then the aggregate statistics of interest are computed over the 1 0 0  
simulation draws. The sensitivity rows report the coefficients from a regression using 
the simulated data of consumption growth on lagged labour income growth and lagged 
unemployment growth, respectively. S.E. are the standard errors from these regressions. 
Mean un is the mean rate of unemployment. Numbers in bold are different from zero at
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the 5% statistical significance level. The statistics are computed over 172 periods over
2000 individuals.
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Table 2.7
Incomplete Information Model (Individual Statistics) - monthly frequency
Variable Bench &ug 9 a  ^  — 0 .1 u j  = .5 Peg = Q
Mean c .976 .978 .977 .975 .978
Mean ce .981 .983 .982 .979 .983
Mean cu .903 .903 .900 .907 .903
Mean b .949 .949 .934 1.24 .949
Median b .957 .963 .944 1.27 .960
Mean be .980 .981 .967 1.28 .981
Mean bu .453 453 .444 .623 .451
Mean 5 .701 .701 .701 .791 .701
tf(A Cit) .043 .042 .043 .045 .042
a(AYit) .191 .188 .190 .218 .188
Prob Exit Un (%) 50.4 50.4 50.4 54.7 50.4
Drop in c (%) 8 . 1 8 .1 8.3 7.39 8.14
Drop in b (%) 53.8 53.9 54.1 51.3 54.0
Notes to Table 2.7: All simulations are performed at a monthly frequency to capture 
high frequency unemployment dynamics. DC refers to the model without unemployment 
risk which is identical to Deaton (1991) and similar to Carroll (1997), except for the 
frequency in decision making. For the benchmark specification, =  1 — r = .02/12, 
u j  — 0.6, f i g  — .02/12, au = 0.1, ag = .02/v^l2, aug =  0.005, a ^  =  .08/\/l2, 
4> — 0.75, <J{ = 0.2, peg — —0.7, as = 0.06 and >c =  —3.45. Lower case variables
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are normalized by the permanent component of individual labour income. A is chosen 
so that the mean probability of finding employment after one month is around 50%. 
This generates a value for A =  1. The risk aversion coefficient is chosen to generate a 
drop in consumption of around 8 % in mean consumption from the employment to the 
unemployment state generating p  =  1.2. The last two rows refer to the drop in mean 
normalized consumption and savings from an employment to an unemployment state. 
The statistics are computed over 172*3 periods over 2000 individuals and averaged over 
1 0 0  simulation draws..
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Table 2.8
Incomplete Information Model (Aggregate Statistics) - quarterly frequency
Variable Bench Gug 9 II p i—» u  =  .5 rn so II o
Mean A C t .005 .005 .005 .005 .005
Q ) .009 .009 .008 .008 .008
Mean AYt .005 .005 .005 .005 .005
*(AYt) .014 .012 .011 .014 .012
a ( A C t ) / a ( A Y t ) .604 .681 .722 .595 .707
C o r r { A C u A Y t) .795 .879 .871 .811 .777
C o r r ( A C u A U t ) - .3 6 - .3 6 -.3 2 -.3 3 -.006
C a r r ( A Y u A U t ) - .5 5 - .6 2 - .5 0 - .6 0 -.3 8 5
Sensitivity (AYt_i) .131 .181 .154 .152 .151
s .e . (Ayt_o .053 .063 .062 .05 .06
Sensitivity ( A U t- i ) -.002 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002
S.E. (AUt- X) .002 .002 .003 .002 .002
Mean Un (%) 5.6 5.56 5.88 5.12 5.55
Notes to Table 2.8: See notes to Table 2.7. For this table, cross sectional averages 
are first taken and then the aggregate statistics of interest are computed over the 1 0 0  
simulation draws. The sensitivity rows report the coefficients from a regression using 
the simulated data of consumption growth on lagged labour income growth and lagged 
unemployment growth, respectively. S.E. are the standard errors from these regressions. 
Mean un is the mean rate of unemployment. Numbers in bold are different from zero at
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the 5% statistical significance level. The statistics are computed over 172 periods over
2000 individuals.
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CHAPTER 3
Chapter Three: Short Job Tenures and Firing Taxes in the  
Search Theory o f Unem ploym ent
3.1. Introduction
It has long been argued that differences in unemployment rates and labour 
market performance across countries can be considered as structural and should 
be sought in the institutional arrangements and the different policy regulations 
employed by individual governments. Emphasis in the theoretical literature has 
been placed upon Employment Protection Legislation (E P L ) and its consequences 
for leading labour market indicators such as job creation and job destruction. 
E P L  consists of a set of rules that affect the process of dismissals. Hence, it is 
an additional cost that has to be incurred by the firm when laying off employees. 
Distinction in these restrictions falls in two categories: severance compensation 
and firing taxes. The latter is a penalty imposed by the government outside the 
firm-worker pair while the former is a pure transfer from the employer to the 
fired employee. Contract theory has established that in the presence of full wage 
flexibility, the two parties can write contracts in such a way so as to render the 
effects of these transfers neutral (see Lazear, 1988 and 1990). As a result, the vast
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majority of the literature has focused on the concept of firing taxes1. This chapter 
will move along these lines2.
Firing taxes include administrative, procedural, legal and any other financial 
penalties that a ruling judge may impose on the firm when a separation is initiated. 
From a theoretical point of view, these costs are shown to suppress firing and hiring 
making thus the recruitment and dismissal processes smoother over the business 
cycle (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 2001; Bertola et al., 2000). Hence, sharp 
employment reductions are expected to occur less frequently in economies with 
stringent EPL. Empirical results are however and to some extent inconclusive.
Table 3.1 presents cross country comparisons for the E P L  ranking of selected 
economies during the late 1980s and 1990s. Individual scores are first decomposed 
into two different contractual arrangements (temporary and regular contracts) and 
then an overall rating is reported. By using the job turnover rate (JT R ) as a proxy 
for labour market flexibility, Figure 3.1.a illustrates the relationship between E PL  
and JT R  for 17 OECD economies in the late 1980s. It appears that a negative 
relationship does tend to manifest itself in the data, although it is quite surprising 
to observe that heavily regulated countries such as Italy, France and Sweden have 
the same or even higher JT R  with that of the US, an economy with relaxed E PL  
policies (a point made also by Bertola et al., 2000). However, if JT R  of continuing 
establishments only is taken into account, the direction of association becomes
^ee Garibaldi and Violante (2004) for a discussion on wage rigidity and severance compensation.
2At the time this chapter was written (2001-2002), a paper with similar results was published in 
Labour Economics [Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, Labour Economics 9 (2002) 63-91].
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more ambiguous (see Figure 3.1.b). On top of this, the legislation governing the 
Difficulty of Dismissal on permanent contracts3 - which is a major component of 
E P L  (with a correlation coefficient of around 0.87) and is the closest in meaning to 
what is considered as firing taxes since it excludes legislation regarding severance 
compensation - is shown to be unrelated if not somewhat positively related to job 
turnover (see Figures 3.2.a and 3.2.b). It seems that the protective policies affect 
the dynamics of the labour market in more ways than the theoretically established 
ones and probably in opposite directions4.
One possible explanation for the overall pattern is that restrictions do not 
usually cover workers in short tenures. Thus, stringent regulations may enlarge 
the pool of short term jobs - as firms attempt to circumvent termination laws - 
and as a result aggravate JTR . In practice, there are two sources of labour market 
legislation that can give rise to such short tenures: probation periods which offer an 
initial adjustment period for both the employer and the employee and temporary 
or fixed term contracts (TC). The former usually provide a firing tax-free period 
of a few months but can be extended for up to two years, as in the case of the 
UK (see Table 3.2, Panel A). Temporary contracts are likely to be more relevant 
for the purpose of this study since they involve fixed term employer-employee
3The terms “regular” and “permanent” contract will be used interchangeably throughout this 
paper.
4It should be noted that one needs to be a little cautious about these conclusions because no 
controls have been used (controling for firm size could turn out to be important but unfortu­
nately this is not possible in the data) and because the sample size is relatively small, excluding 
economies like Greece, Portugal and Spain which have notoriously stringent policies.
128
relations that vary from two to three years. It is important to emphasize that in 
these cases, notice periods and severance compensation are prohibited and workers 
cannot initiate procedures for unfair dismissal. That said, temporary contracts are 
in effect dismissal cost-free periods. Concerning duration, agreements can usually 
be renewed but in general they cannot exceed a certain predetermined cumulative 
period5 (see Table 3.2, Panel B). As a result, when the contract expires the pair is 
either left with the option to separate or continue by writing a regular contract in 
which case layoff costs become operational6.
During the mid-1980s Germany and Spain relaxed restrictions on TCs. Biichte- 
mann (1991, 1993) and Milner et al. (1995) note that despite similar reforms in 
the regulation of fixed term contracts the impact was sharply different in the two 
countries and has taken many years to unfold. The OECD, in the Employment 
Outlook 1999, suggests that one candidate explanation could be identified on the 
basis that "...the potential future firing costs due to E P L that were associated 
with hiring a worker on a permanent contract remained larger in Spain than in 
Germany” (OECD, 1999, ch. 2  p.71). Under such an assumption - and besides 
adversely affecting JT R  - such policies could influence the composition of employ­
ment regarding permanency on the job.
5If such a condition does arise, "...courts can be called upon to examine the validity of the reason 
given and may declare the fixed term unjustified, judging that its main purpose is to circumvent 
termination laws" (OECD, 1999, ch.2 p.59).
6It is true that in the past, temporary contracts were limited to so-called specific projects or 
seasonal work. However, the majority of the countries have by now either lifted or significantly 
relaxed these requirements. Hence, continuation on regular contract terms is straightforward if 
beneficial to both parties.
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Keeping in mind the well known limitations dictated by the nature and avail­
ability of information of E P L  indicators7, Table 3.3 summarizes the estimation 
results of regressing the share of temporary employment on the measures of em­
ployment protection of 24 OECD countries for the late 1990s. The first two columns 
refer to a simple univariate regression while the last two include additional variables 
to control for country specific effects. The number of additional variables however, 
ought to be kept to a minimum given the limited number of observations available. 
In the estimations both indicators of E P L  in regular contracts were used. The 
dependent variable (TE) is the average of temporary employment shares between 
1998 and 2002 while the policy indicators refer to the late 1990s8. This was done 
to avoid any potential endogeneity problems and because changes in policy may 
require time until their effects become evident. Not surprisingly, the sign of the 
estimated coefficients in the univariate regressions is within the lines of the pre­
vious discussion, their magnitude is quite considerable and they are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Regarding the multivariate regressions, the un­
employment rate (UR) is included because higher unemployment rate might make 
agents more willing to commit themselves to temporary contractual agreements9 
and the labour productivity growth (LPG R ) is added on the basis that higher 
rate of growth may induce more investment in human capital and thus encourage
7See Bertola et al. (2000) for an extended discussion on the issue.
Estimations were also performed by averaging the variables over 1996-2002 but with no noticable 
changes in the results.
9There may be an endogeneity issue here, but this will not affect estimates for employment 
protection.
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longer employer-employee relationships. Finally, GDP  growth (GDPGR) is in­
cluded as a standard control variable. The estimation documents that legislation 
is a significant determinant of temporary employment. The estimated coefficients 
are marginally lower than before and they are still statistically significant at better 
than 5 percent 10 (this result is consistent with the findings of Grubb and Wells, 
1993). Overall, the regulation governing dismissals in permanent contracts seems 
to matter for the composition of employment. For this reason, one needs a theoret­
ical grounding of how this mechanism depends on policy design and how it affects 
the equilibrium. To do so, such policies must be explicitly modelled11.
To incorporate regulations of this kind in a search model of unemployment, 
one does not need necessarily to resort to a model of endogenous job destruction. 
Indeed, I will use the simplest framework possible to raise the issue by building on 
a model of exogenous job separation. Of course, under such an assumption, the 
link between termination taxes and employment protection is broken12. This needs 
not be of serious concern however, as the purpose of this paper is to identify the 
conditions under which firing restrictions may amplify the separation rate. All in 
all, I make no attempt to justify why dismissal taxes are in place. Yet, I use such
10Additional variables were also included in the regression but without any changes in the results. 
Examples include union density, subsidies to regular employment as well as the EPL  indicators 
for temporary employment.
11 Although not exactly the same in reality, I will use the terms “probation period” and “tempo­
rary contract (TC)” interchangably for the needs of this paper.
12Although and as it will become clear later in the paper, such policies can be justified on the 
grounds of reducing wage inequality.
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an assumption as given and study its consequences for wages, unemployment rate 
and job destruction.
Overall, the study raises the issue of the complexity of such policies and makes 
an effort to fill in a potential gap in the literature. Moreover, it advocates that some 
of the observed phenomena concerning turnover rates as well as the composition 
of employment regarding permanency on the job could, at least partially and in 
principle be addressed within the discussed mechanism.
The next section describes the structure of the model- it starts with an overview 
of the notation and assumptions and then discusses the two alternative environ­
ments upon which, the model will be built. Section 3 explains the possible equi­
libria outcomes and studies the relationship between firing taxes, job destruction 
and unemployment rate. Section 4 illustrates the effects of such policies on differ­
ent productivity groups and wage differentials while section 5 proceeds with some 
computational experiments. Section 6  concludes this chapter.
3.2. The model
3.2.1. Notation and assumptions
The model put forward is a standard search and matching model of exogenous 
job destruction pioneered by Mortensen (1978) and Pissarides (1984, 1985 and 
2000). One usual assumption is that each firm employs one worker. Firms without 
workers post vacancies at a cost of pc, where p is the job’s productivity. The 
vacancy cost is proportional to productivity under the assumption that it is more
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costly to acquire more productive workers. It is also sunk and thus the investment 
undertaken by the firm is irreversible. In equilibrium, job creation is governed by 
profit maximization by taking into account expected revenue and cost of a newly 
created match. The matching function m(v,u) which directs employer-employee 
meetings is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous 
of degree one in vacancies (v) and unemployment (u)13.
All realized job matches yield a pure economic rent. If the worker and the firm 
separate, each party will have to go through a costly search process in order to 
meet its next partner. It is this rent that has to be shared in the wage contract. 
Here, I assume that this surplus is divided in fixed proportions between the firm 
and the worker in a bargaining process where ft represents labour’s share.
Negative shocks arrive to existing matches at the Poisson rate S. When this 
happens the productivity of the job is reduced to zero and hence the match dis­
solves. However, the latter may not be the only source of job destruction. After 
the worker and the firm match, the job enters a probation time period T  whose 
length is determined by policy. During this time, employers can costlessly fire 
existing workers. If the match survives and this period elapses, the firm becomes 
liable to a firing tax pF, again imposed by policy. Therefore, the implementation 
of a firing restriction that becomes operational after a predetermined period of 
time introduces a process of endogenous separation decisions since firms may find
13Empirically, studies establish the existence of an aggregate matching function with constant 
returns to scale. See Divine and Kiefer (1991) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey 
of the issue.
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it optimal to destroy the match instead of becoming liable to the termination tax 
in the future.
To simplify what follows, and without loss of generality, assume that the date 
of job creation is always denoted as r  =  0. The remaining of the notation that will 
be used is: V  the value of a vacant job (irrespective of time), J  the value of an 
active job at date of creation, J(t) the value of an active job at t (created at r  =  0), 
W  the value of employment at date of creation, W (t ) the value of employment at 
t (created at r  =  0), U the value of unemployment (irrespective of time), z  the 
unemployment income and r the interest rate.
3.2.2. Regim e 1: F irm s dism iss workers a t T
I begin by examining the equilibrium where firms find it beneficial to dispose off 
the match at the end of T  (this will be referred to as regime 1 and be denoted 
with the script 1 ). Given a matching function m(v,u) the probability that a 
worker will arrive to a vacant job is equal to m (v , u)/v  while the probability that 
an unemployed agent will find an unoccupied working opportunity is m (v,u)/u . 
Using the homogeneity of the matching function, one can rewrite the latter two as 
functions of the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. Let 6  be equal to v /u  and 
refer to it as the market tightness. Therefore, the rate at which vacant jobs become 
filled is denoted by q(Q) =  m(9 , 1 ) and the rate at which unemployed agents move 
into employment is 9q(0) =  6 m(6 , 1 ).
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The asset pricing equation for the return of a vacant job is given by:
(3.1) rV 1 =  -p c  +  q(6 ) [ J 1 -  V 1]
A vacant job costs pc per unit of time and changes state at a rate q{0). When 
job creation takes place, it yields a net return of J 1 — V 1. Free entry implies that 
V 1 = 0 and thus:
(3.2) J 1 =
(3.2) will be referred to as the job creation condition. It states that in equilibrium 
firms will create vacant jobs to the point where the value of a newly created match 
equals the expected cost of maintaining a vacancy.
Following similar reasoning:
(3.3) ~ V ~  wi{t) — SJl (t) +  J l (t)
where w\(t) is the wage rate in regime 1, t G [0, T] and lim*_/r J 1 (t) — 0. Note that 
in regime 1 , firms never pay the firing tax since they always dismiss employees at 
the end of T. Finally, the job loses value as time progresses because it approaches 
the end of its life-cycle.
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The values of employment and unemployment satisfy the following asset pricing 
equations respectively:
(3.4) r W \ t )  =  W!(t) -  6  [W \ t ) -  U1} +  W \t)
(3.5) rU 1 = z +  Oq{B) [W1 -  U1]
The capital value of employment is equal to its net return w\ (t ) minus the risk of 
changing state to unemployment and the capital value of unemployment is equal 
to unemployment income adjusted for the possibility that the agent will become 
employed. 2  may refer to a state provided benefit or imputed income from leisure or 
a combination of the two. I will discuss later the implications of such assumptions 
when I study productivity differences.
3.2.2.1 . W age determ ination . When the worker and the firm meet they share 
the surplus match value in fixed proportions. Thus the wage is set to maximize the 
Nash product (J 1 — I/1)1 -/3  (W 1 — U1)13. By assuming that the same bargaining 
holds for all future renegotiations, one obtains:
(3.6) w\ = ( 1  — (3)z -f- /3p(l +  c9)
(see Appendix 3.A for an explicit derivation of wi).
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The wage is constant in t since both, employer and employee, make capital 
losses as t —*T.  These loses must be shared according to the Nash bargaining 
rule.
3.2.2 .2 . Jo b  value. Given the wage and an exogenously probation period set by 
policy, the optimal value of a job in regime 1 at any t G [0, T] is given by:
(3.7) J 1 (t) = J  [p -  wj]e-(r+i)(s- ()ds
By setting t — 0 one obtains:
(3.8) J x = [  [p -« ) 1*]e-(r+i>sds
Jo
or, because both p and are independent of time and w{ is given by (3.6):
(3.9) (r +  S) J 1 = [p — (1 — (3)z — /3p( 1 +  c6 )\[1 — e~(r+<5)T]
Clearly, J 1 converges to 0 as T  -+0  and to \p — (1 — /3)z — (3p( 1 +  c6 )]/(r +  S) as 
T  —> -foo.
3.2.2.3. E quilibrium  in regim e 1 . A solution to the model of regime 1 consists 
of a job value and a market tightness pair (J u , 6 *) that solves (3.2) and (3.9). 
Since the former is an upward sloping curve in the (J, 6 ) space while the latter is a 
downward sloping one, existence of unique equilibrium is guaranteed. Equilibrium
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market tightness is then determined by:
(3.10) [p -  ( 1  -  fS)z -  /3p(l +  c6 *)} [1 -  e (r+,5)T] -  (r +  =  0
Inspection of (3.10) easily establishes that the l.h.s. is decreasing in 0* and in­
creasing in T  implying that equilibrium market tightness increases monotonically 
in the probation period. The intuition for this is simple: an increase in T  makes 
the expected life of a job longer. As a result the job value curve shifts upwards de­
termining higher market tightness, higher job value and higher wage. Since both, 
the equilibrium job value and equilibrium market tightness are monotonically in­
creasing in T  it immediately follows that J 1*, 6 * and w\ are always less than their 
respective values in a policy-free equilibrium.
3.2.3. Regim e 2: F irm s do no t destroy surviving m atches a t T
In regime 2 all firms chose not to dismiss workers in surviving matches at the end 
of the fixed horizon. Alternatively, a TC  is transformed to a permanent contract 
with probability one, conditional on that the match has survived to T.
As before, the asset pricing equation for a new vacancy is given by:
(3.11) rV 2 = -p c  +  q(0) [J2 -  V 2]
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where again profit maximization implies:
3^-12) J2 = ^y
Consider now the job value for any t € [0, T]:
/T  poo[p — W2]e~(r+S^ s~^ ds +  j  \p — W2 — 5pF]e~(r+6^ s~^ ds
and by setting t = 0
p T  poo
(3.14) J 2 = \p — W2\e~(r+S^ sds +  / \p — W2 — SpF]e~(r+s s^ds
Jo Jt
The value of a job equals its net return p — W2 - The job also runs a risk of being 
destroyed which will result in the loss of J 2. If the match survives to T, the firm 
is locked in and will incur a firing tax pF  with probability 5 at each t > T.
The dismissal payment is assumed to be proportional to productivity on the 
grounds that it is more costly to get rid off a more productive worker than a less 
productive one. Of course, after TC  is terminated, the asset pricing equation 
becomes:
(3.15) (r +  S) J 2T = p — w2 — SpF
139
Finally, the equations for the values of employment and unemployment respec­
tively, are:
/T  p o o[ w 2 +  SU2}e-ir+s)<-s- t)ds +  j  [ w2 +  SU2 }e-(r+sHa-Qds
(3.17) rU 2 = z +  0q(9) [W2 -  U2]
3.2.3.1 . W age determ ination . As before, the wage is set to split the surplus 
match value in fixed proportions. Consider now a firm at the date of job creation 
(or at any t G [0,T]). If it separates from the employee its loss will be J 2{t). On 
the other hand, if destruction takes place after T, its loss will be J 2T +  pF. This 
difference suggests the presence of a two-tier wage: an initial wage until T  and a 
second one from T  onwards.
The initial wage is given by:
(3.18) = (1 — P)z + ftp{ 1 +  c6 )
while the second one is:
(3.19) W2T = (1 -  /3)z + /3p(l + c0) + prpF  
(see Appendix 3.A for a formal derivation).
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W2t  - the “insider” wage - is shown to be higher than the “outsider” one (^ 2 )- 
This is because of the fact that after T  has elapsed the firm is locked in and as a 
result the “continuation” wage increases in the firing tax.
Some authors reject the plausibility of a two-tier wage (see Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1988) by arguing that the worker has no credible threat to force renegotia­
tion. In any case, this issue has to be challenged on empirical grounds although its 
implications would affect the predictions of the model quantitatively but not qual­
itatively. It has to be noted however that Friesen (1996) who studied the wages of 
workers subject to different regulations from different Canadian provinces, found 
that after controlling for education, firm size, occupation and industry, incumbent 
workers protected from legislation appeared to extract higher wages than workers 
not protected by law and that starting wages tended to fall to offset subsequent 
increases.
3.2.3.2. E quilibrium  in regim e 2 . A solution to the model of regime 2  consists 
of a job value and a market tightness pair (J2* ,9**) that solves (3.12) and (3.14) by 
first substituting out the wages in (3.14). For the same reason as before, existence of 
unique equilibrium is guaranteed. Equilibrium market tightness is now determined 
by:
(3.20) \ p - ( l - 0 ) z -  (3p{ 1 +  cB**)\ -  e~{r+6)TpF((3r +  6 ) -  (r +  S) ^  = 0
Clearly, equilibrium 9 is again shown to be increasing in T.
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3.3. Equilibrium
Given the two alternatives, the equilibrium can be identified by establishing the 
conditions under which the strategy of an individual firm z is optimal given the 
strategy chosen by the rest of the firms in the economy14. In other words, one seeks 
to find a range of F  for which given that all firms, except firm z, dismiss workers 
in surviving matches at T, dismissal at T  corresponds to the optimal response of 
firm z as well and a range of F  for which given that all firms, except firm z, do not 
dismiss workers in surviving matches at T, not dismissal at T  corresponds to the 
optimal response of firm z as well.
P roposition  1. Let 9* be the equilibrium market tightness in regime 1. Then 
for any finite T, there exists an F * where:
(3.21) F* =  +p(fir +  <5)
such that:
(a) For F > F* there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which all firms 
dismiss workers in surviving matches at T.
(b) For F  =  F* some dismissal may take place at T.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B □
14Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that firm i is too small to affect market tightness.
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Proposition 2. Let 9** be the equilibrium market tightness in regime 2. Then 
for any finite T, there exists an F** where:
( 3  22) F ”  =  +
p(/3r +  8)
such that:
(a) For F  < F** there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which all firms do 
not dismiss workers in surviving matches at T.
(b) For F  =  F** some dismissal may take place at T .
Proof. See Appendix 3.B □
Proposition 3. Let 9* and 9** be the equilibrium values of market tightness in 
regimes 1 and 2 respectively. Then for F  = F** :
(3.23) F* = F** always
Proof. See Appendix 3.B □
Given Propositions 1 , 2 and 3, Corollary 1 follows:
Proposition 4. For any increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one 
matching function and for any finite T, there exists an F  such that:
(3.24) F  =
p(/3r +  S)
and:
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Corollary 5. (1)
(a) For all F  > F  all firms chose to destroy surviving matches at T
(b) For all F  < F  all firms chose not to destroy surviving matches at T
(c) For F  = F some dismissal may take place at T.
Proposition 4 suggests that implementing a probation period regulation (or 
facilitating the use of TCs)  may result in jobs being destroyed not only due to 
the arrival of an adverse shock but also as the outcome of endogenous separation 
decisions at T. As a result, such a policy may adversely affect the job turnover 
rate because of the more frequent firing taking place.
3.3.1. Equilibrium unemployment
In this section I discuss the implications for equilibrium unemployment. There 
are two cases to consider: when T  = 0  in which case the model collapses to the 
Pissarides version (2 0 0 0 , ch. 9) and when T  is non-zero and finite15.
When T  = 0 there is no equilibrium in regime 1 because in any meaningful 
equilibrium the job value must be strictly positive. Therefore, by equating job 
creation to job destruction, steady state equilibrium unemployment is given by:
<325>
15Clearly, I abstract from the possibility of T  —> +oo since trivially this implies that there are in 
effect no firing restrictions.
144
(where the superscript 0 indicates that T  = 0). Since 6 ** is increasing in the 
probation period and u is decreasing in 0 16, u**° is unambiguously higher than its 
respective value in a policy-free environment.
If T  is non-zero and finite one needs to consider whether F < F , F > F  or 
F = F.
Under the assumption that F  < F, equilibrium unemployment rate is again 
given by (3.25) where now the equilibrium value of market tightness is higher, 
implying a lower value for unemployment.
When F > F  and with an exogenous arrival rate of the adverse shock drawn 
from a Poisson distribution, the fraction of newly created jobs that survive to T  is 
given by e~ST and therefore job destruction is now determined by:
(3.26) JD t  =  5(1 -  uT) + JC Te~ST
(where again the superscript T  indicates the finite probation horizon). Hence, 
equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:
( 3 '2 7 )  “ *T =  S +  e'Tq(FT)(  l - e - W )
16Implicit to this, is the assumption that the direct effect of 9 on u  more than offsets the indirect 
effect through q(0).
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Comparison with (3.25) reveals that it is not necessary for unemployment to be 
higher when T  = 0. More specifically, if:
(3.28) 9*Tq(9*T) ( 1  -  e~5T) < 9**°q (9**°)
then u*T will be higher than u**°. In other words, the introduction of a trial period 
(or T C ) which seems to “alleviate” the policy restrictions, may actually amplify 
the unemployment rate by enabling employers to destroy surviving matches at the 
end of T. The latter is more likely to be true when T  is relatively small and as a 
result the more frequent job destruction will cause unemployment to rise.
Finally when F = F  some dismissal may take place. The equilibrium cannot 
be predicted ex ante but the possible outcomes can be Pareto ranked, at least 
in terms of unemployment. To see this consider what happens when F  =  F: 
equilibrium market tightness is the same in both regimes. Therefore, uT(9*T) is 
unambiguously higher than uT(9**T) because of the dismissal occurring at T. All 
other cases are clearly worse off than uT(9**T) since some destruction takes place 
at T, but better off than uT(9*T) because some workers are being kept at jobs 
when the TC  terminates.
3.3.2. Firing taxes, probation period and the job destruction rate
Examination of (3.24) establishes that there is a close link between the two policy 
instruments. Namely, fiF /fiT  < 0 since ,99*/'9T > 0 always. As T  expands, J 1*
increases (the job value curve shifts upwards). This is also true for regime 2, but 
this positive effect is partly offset by the more heavily discounted profits after T. 
As a result, J 1* increases faster than J 2* in T  and hence a lower F  is required to 
make firms willing to switch/stay to regime 1 .
As the firing tax increases and approaches F  from below, equilibrium unemploy­
ment rate rises, makes a jump upwards when F = F  and remains fixed thereafter 
(while equilibrium market tightness decreases until F  and then stays the same 
irrespective of F). This situation is depicted in Figure 3.
All the above have implications for the steady state job destruction rate i.e. 
the inflow of workers into the unemployment pool. When firms chose optimally 
not to dismiss employees at T, the job destruction rate is equal to 8 . As the firing 
restriction becomes more harsh and exceeds the critical value F , the job destruction 
rate makes an upward jump and remains constant for all F > F. More specifically, 
its value is given by:
(3.29) JD R  = i r - l =jy
J  DR  rises because at each t a fraction 8  of matches dissolves and an additional 
proportion of jobs is destroyed as it reaches the end of the fixed period. The only 
thing that matters now is the length of T. Indeed, (3.29) reveals that expansions 
of T  cause JD R  to decrease as a result of a less frequent dismissal.
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Overall, heavy layoff costs are likely to induce employers to destroy matches at 
T. When this happens, the resulting job separation rate will increase and it will 
be higher the shorter the length of the TC  is.
By taking the assumption of firing taxes as given, the analysis establishes a the­
oretical approach within which such regulations can be examined explicitly. In this 
respect, it demonstrates the complexity of dismissal policies and offers a potential 
explanation for the observed patterns. Firstly, it suggests that temporary tenures 
are likely to be observed mostly when firing restrictions on regular contracts are 
more severe, something consistent with the data. Secondly, it argues that outflows 
of jobs and workers may be inversely affected by such ruling procedures, something 
which may be hidden behind the ambiguous empirical relationship between E P L  
and the job turnover rates.
3.4. Productivity Differences
This section discusses productivity differences in segmented markets and the 
effects of policy on worker groups of diverse skills.
Before proceeding, one must stress the importance of the assumptions governing 
the unemployment income. As the analysis suggests, this income is independent of 
worker skill. Clearly, this makes sense if the latter is defined to be imputed income 
from leisure activities. Of course, it can include other forms of income as well 
such as state provided unemployment benefit but these would have to be made 
proportional to p (or w). What turns out to be crucial for the results that follow is
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that at least some portion of the income that has to be given up when transition 
from unemployment to employment takes place, is independent of productivity. 
This assumption reassures that market tightness and wages increase with skill and 
that unemployment rates fall. A second important issue is that skill markets are 
segmented. That is, each firm and worker participate solely in one market with the 
same level of productivity. Finally, the length of the probation period (or TC) must 
be irrespective of skill. This is actually not a bad claim. The vast majority of real 
world policy schemes coincides with this assertion. In practice, some distinctions 
are made for blue and white collar workers but no other differentiation is made for 
the productivity differences within each group.
To facilitate the analysis, I will consider the simplest case possible: two different 
levels of productivity which will be referred to as "high" and "low" skill. Given the 
discussion of the previous section one can formally derive the following Proposition:
P roposition  6 . Let ph and pl denote the productivity levels of high and low 
skilled workers respectively, with:
(3.30) ph = apl, and a > 1
Then for any finite and common among skill groups T, it is true that:
(3.31) F h > F l always
Proof. See Appendix 3.B □
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Proposition 4 establishes that there is a range of firing taxes such that for 
any F  € (Fl, F h), employers in high skilled jobs keep their workers while firms 
in low productivity matches dismiss employees at the end of T.  Workers in these 
two segmented markets enjoy different wages, face different unemployment and 
job turnover rates not only because their different productivity levels determine 
different equilibrium market tightness but also because the initiation of such a 
policy causes different firm responses.
The argument can be generalized. Hence, Proposition 5 follows:
P roposition  7. Let there be a distribution of productivities in the economy 
with CDF P(p). Then, there is a distribution of critical tax levels across different 
productivity groups, so that G(F) is the proportion of firms that chose to destroy 
surviving matches at the end o fT  (where G(-) is the CDF of the firing restriction).
Proof. See Appendix 3.B □
Based on Proposition 5, JD R  is determined by:
(3.32) JD R  = G(F)5 1  +  [1 -  G(F)}S
Clearly, a rise in the firing tax unambiguously amplifies the job destruction 
rate as it augments the proportion of jobs that are being destroyed at T.
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3.4.1. Wage inequality
Given different tax thresholds among different productivity clusters, wage inequal­
ity is one of the first things that come immediately to mind. This is particularly 
relevant since the implementation of policies of this short is usually justified on 
the grounds of protecting lower-skilled groups that are more vulnerable to the un­
employment risk and the reduction in real wages. For this reason, I now raise the 
question of whether wage inequality rises or falls when a policy is initiated.
P roposition  8 . Let apl and pl denote the productivity levels of high and low 
skilled workers respectively, Va > 1. Then, for any increasing, concave and homo­
geneous of degree one matching function, wage inequality is highest when no policy 
is implemented and lowest when T  = 0. For any finite and non-zero T, the wage 
differential increases with T  and is higher when F  G (Fl, F h).
Proof. See Appendix 3.B □
The reason that wage inequality decreases with policy is based on the pro­
portionality of the firing tax to the productivity level. As a consequence, the 
downward shift of the job value curve is less smooth for the high-skilled group 
resulting in a reduction in the difference of the two equilibrium tightness values 
which in turn causes a decrease in the wage differential. Since temporary prede­
termined tenures introduce a tax-free period, it follows that inequality rises with 
T. Moreover, inequality is magnified whenever F  G (Fl, F h) because insiders’
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wage increases further relative to that of the other group and it is only high-skilled 
workers that become insiders. Overall, this is the most interesting result. Such 
policy designs may not only intensify job destruction margins but aggravate wage 
differentials by endogenously creating a dichotomy between insiders and outsiders 
i.e. employees who enjoy the benefits of protection and those who do not.
3.5. C om putational experim ents
In this section I provide computed solutions that can proliferate the model’s 
implications for policy design and put to the test its ability to replicate real world 
examples. For the most part I will use the parameter values that are provided in 
Mortensen (1994). The numerical values for the fixed period and the level of firing 
taxes are deduced from OECD data, Guell (2003) and Garibaldi and Violante 
(2004).
The functional form of the aggregate matching function is assumed to be log 
linear, so that:
(3.33) q(6 ) = AO~T}, for some A  > 0
I normalize the time period to be one quarter and without loss of generality 
set the average productivity p equal to 1 while concentrating on the implications 
for the high productivity group (p = 1.5) and the low productivity one (p = 0.5) 
- which I assume to be of equal proportions. The interest rate is set to 0.01. The 
recruiting cost, the value of leisure and labour’s share are fixed to 0.3, 0.349 and
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0.5 respectively as in Mortensen (1994). In what follows, I will abstract from the 
possibility of search externalities17 and concentrate only on efficient equilibrium 
outcomes by setting the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment (77) 
equal to 0.5.
By trial and error, I adjust the values of A  and S so that on average the model 
reproduces an equilibrium unemployment rate around 1 0  percent and an expected 
duration of unemployment of four to five months. This gives me A = 0.65 and 
S = 0.08.
As far as the length of T  is concerned, I use the information provided by 
the OECD regarding the maximum cumulated duration allowed for fixed term 
contracts (see Table 3.2, Panel B). For this reason I set T  equal to 8 , 10, 12 and 
1418. Information for the firing taxes is not easily identified. Garibaldi and Violante 
(2004), using information from Guell (2003) estimate that the total firing costs in 
Italy endured by firms upon separation, amount to around seven monthly wages. 
The latter is adjusted for the relevant probability of a worker’s appeal for unfair 
dismissal being granted. However, this estimate includes severance compensation 
as well and needs to be decomposed into its two different components. Garibaldi 
and Violante find that on average firing taxes are equal to around 24 to 34 percent 
of the entire firing charge incurred. Based on these findings, I assume that the 
policy maker decides for the level of the firing restriction according to the wage of
17See Hosios (1990).
18I set T  equal to 14 as well, under the assumption that sometimes the temporary contract may 
be extended for a short period of time.
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the average productivity group (p — 1 ) that would have been agreed, should the 
temporary contract become permanent (since it is the stringency governing regular 
employment that is of main concern). The wage however is endogenously derived 
and as a result a numerical value cannot be explicitly computed. Therefore, I start 
with an initial guess for F  and change it accordingly until the latter and the one 
implied by the equilibrium in regime 2  converge.
Simulation results are illustrated in Table 1.4. When the temporary contract 
lasts for 2 years there is no equilibrium in regime 1 (not reported). When the 
period is extended to 1 0  quarters, a firing tax residing at the higher band will 
induce lower productivity firms to destroy surviving matches at T. This suggest 
that the model has the ability to offer theoretically one candidate explanation as 
to why temporary contracts grew only modestly in countries like Ireland and Italy
i.e. economies with quite short maximum cumulated period allowed.
As the period increases to 3 and 4 years, only modest firing charges are required 
to make employers of low productivity jobs willing to terminate the contract at T. 
This might replicate the cases of Portugal and Spain which allow quite prolonged 
TCs  and have seen a remarkable expansion of temporary employment during the 
1990’s and early 2000’s.
The average job destruction rates are clearly amplified by the presence of heavy 
dismissal costs. The percentage increase in average JD R  ranges from 40 percent 
(when T  — 10 and F = 0.732) to 24 percent (when T  = 14 and F = 0.631).
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Figures 4 and 5 deliver a clear illustration of the disadvantage of low produc­
tivity workers when common firing restrictions are in place. The wage differential 
increases with T  (Figure 5) and jumps upwards when it is optimal for low-skilled 
firms to dismiss workers at the end of T. The area within the two curves in Figure 
4 corresponds to low skilled workers being fired when the contract expires but high 
productivity matches, that have survived to T, being retained. In an endogenous 
job destruction framework, tightening termination laws would reduce the separa­
tion rate in those matches that are preserved but aggravate it in the rest. The 
overall outcome would depend on the severity of the reform, the preexisting com­
position of employment in terms of contractual agreements and on the distribution 
of productivity. It is this dualism of firing policies that may be responsible for the 
ambiguous overall patterns that we observe in the data.
3.6. Conclusions
Empirical results are to some extent inconclusive about the effects of dismissal 
policies on job and labour flows. Some countries have relatively elevated turnover 
rates despite their strict layoff policies. At the same time, temporary contrac­
tual agreements have seen a notable expansion in economies where heavy firing 
restrictions on regular employment have remained largely in place.
This paper has suggested one reason that could partially explain the observed 
phenomena. Probation periods (or temporary contracts) that enable firms to dis­
solve matches costlessly, may provide incentives to dispose off employees when
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this time period elapses, thereby increasing flows into unemployment. In addition, 
the model predicts that the number of temporary job tenures will increase when 
termination costs on regular employment are high and probation periods long. 
Hence, it gives a clear warning to policy makers when planning the institutional 
arrangements. As the results suggest, the two policy instruments are closely linked 
and one should be cautious for the individual practices about to be exercised as 
they may influence the composition of employment, create groups of insiders and 
outsiders and affect the wage differentials among different productivity clusters.
On the purely empirical side, this work provides an additional motivation for 
collecting data regarding the transition rates of different skill groups. In that way, 
not only one could test the predictions of the model more accurately but provide 
more insight for institutional design.
In any case, the structural differences in employment performance indicators 
call for theoretical improvements in the areas of friction and labour market flexibil­
ity modelling. That could be one way to deepen our understanding of the dynamics 
and try to reconcile some apparent inconsistencies.
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Appendix 3.A: Wage determination
To derive the wage in regime 1 we use the first order condition ft [J1 (t) — V 1] — 
( 1  — ft) [W1 (t) — U1]. Given (3.3) and (3.4) we have:
(Al) p j \ t )  = j  0 \ p -  w1]e-(r+*)(' - ‘)ds
and
(A2) ( 1  - 0 ) [ W 1( t ) - U 1]= f  ( l - ^ ) K - r f / 1]e-(’-+iK<>-‘)ds
Subtracting the two equations and by taking into account that V 1 — 0 :
(A3) 0 =  J  [ftp — w\ +  ( 1  — /?)r£/1]e- (T’+<5^ s-^ds
Differentiating (A3) wrt t, we obtain:
(A4) Wi =  ftp +  ( 1  — ft)rUl
ft ft pcConsider now that W 1 — U1 = ----- - J 1 = -----  t t t  and substitute it into (3.5)I - f t  I - f t  q{6)
to get:
ft(A5) rU1 =  z +  6pc-
1 - f t
Hence, (A5) and (A4) imply that:
(A6 ) w\ = ( 1  -  ft)z + ftp{\ +c6)
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The wage profile is constant in t since both, employer and employee make capital 
losses as t —► T. These losses must be shared according to the Nash bargaining 
procedure. Implicit to this of course is the fact that the wage is renegotiated 
continuously.
To derive the wage in (3.19), we first note that:
(A7)
and that:
(A8 ) (1 -  0)[W™ -  U2] =  (1 -  p ) ^ T ~ rU2r +  o
Using the sharing rule (3 [ J 2T +  pF — V 2] = (1 — 0) [ W ^  — U2] , and (A7) and 
(A8 ) we obtain:
(A9) w2t = /3p +  (1 — (3)rU2 +  (3rpF
and by substituting rU2 out of (A9):
(A10) W2T = (1 — P)z +  j3p( 1 +  cO) +  /3rpF
The initial wage (wJ) is then determined by taking the sharing rule /? [J2T +  pF  
( 1  — p) [W2T — U2] as given.
w% is irrespective of F  because the worker has still no credible threat to nego­
tiate an increase since she knows that if she is fired at any t before T, the firm will
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not have to incur any firing cost. It is this asymmetry between the two parties 
that causes the wage to be lower in all negotiations for t G [0,T].
Appendix 3.B: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The optimality of “dismissal at T” implies that:
(Bl) > J 2(6*)
Note that this rule is always time consistent in the sense that it reassures the op­
timality of the response at T  as well. The intuition for this is simple: dismissal at 
T  will be optimal if expected profits from continuation are non-positive. Substi­
tuting 6* into J 2 results in J 2(6*) = +  J 2T(0*). By implication of (Bl), the
optimality rule is reduced to:
(B2) J 2T{0*) < 0
which defines the following “critical level” of the firing tax:
* = \p -  (I -  P) z -  (3p(l + c6*)\ 
p((3r +  (5)
Proof of Proposition 2
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The proof of Proposition 2 is analogous to that of Proposition 1 with the 
optimally rule now being:
(B4) < J 2{9**)
which implies:
(B5) J 2T{9**) > 0
This gives rise to the following firing tax:
[p -  (1 -  (3) z -  0p ( 1  +  c9**)\(B6 ) F** = p(0r +  5)
Proof
Proof of Proposition 3
The result follows directly by setting F = F** and substituting into (3.20). 
Doing so produces:
(B7) \ p - ( l - 0 ) z -  (3p( 1 +  c0**)\ (1 -  e~{r+s)T) -  (r +  =  0
Comparing (3.10) and (B7), it immediately follows that 0* = 9** and by (3.21) and 
(3.22) we have that F* = F**. Apparently, one derives the same result by setting 
F = F* and substituting into (3.10).
To understand the importance and relevance of proposition 3, it is useful to 
think of F ** as a function of F  (since 9** is - after all - a function of F). Inspection
160
of (3.20) and (3.22) establishes that F**(F) is monotonically increasing and that 
F** > 0 when F = 0. This implies that F**(F) lies above the 45 degree line when 
F < F* and below it when F > F*. In other words, when F < F* it is also true 
that F < F**.
Proof of Proposition 5
The first thing we need to establish is that 0*h is higher than 0*1. This is merely 
a result driven by the fact that high-skill workers enjoy lower relative returns from 
leisure activities. The two equilibrium values are determined by:
( B 8 )  ( r  +  < 5 ) - | ^ -  +  fr teg * [1 -  e ~ ^ T} =  \p‘ -  -  /3p‘}{ 1 -  e- ™ T]
for high skilled when F  =  F h, and
( B 9 )  ( r  +  i )  +  M c T 1 [1 -  e - ^ T )  =  [p' _  (1  _  P)z -  /? p ' ] [ l  _  e - < ^ ]
q(0 )
for low skilled when F  =  F l. Since the l.h.s.’s in both equations are increasing in 
market tightness, it immediately follows that for any a > 1, 6th > 0*'. Given the 
derivation of the critical tax in (3.24), the difference between F h and Fl is given 
by:
(B I O )  F h - F ‘ =  ^  ~  (e*h -  8*1)pl({3r + 8) \  a J (3r +  8 v '
Therefore, the relevant question is whether 0*h — 6*1 §  ^  , ^}Z ( - — -jrcp \  a
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Let
(BID
Then subtracting (B9) from (B8 ) and substituting 9*h — 9*1 out from (B ll), we find 
that (r +  S)c ( — -^r--------------| =  0 which cannot be true since 9*h > 6*1 impliesWO <?(0/
1 1 that ——r- >
<7(0 <7(0'
Assume now that:
(Bi2) e*h -  e*1 > ^  1plc[3 \  a
say 8,h -  8*' =  J for some A > 1 . Then (B8 ), (B9) and (B1 2 )
p e p  \  a J
imply that (r + 5)c ( —  ?-r- ) < 0 which can never be true. Hence it must
w o  # * ' ) /
be that 6*h — 9*1 < ^  ■ ^JZ ( - — and thus:
pep  \  a J
(B13) F h -  F l > 0
Proof of Proposition 6
Let P(p) be the CDF  of productivities across segmented markets. Since F  is 
a continuous function of p then it follows that there is a distribution of F  in the 
economy with e.g. G(F ) as the CDF. Thus, for any actual firing restriction F, 
G(F) represents the percentage of firms that chose to get rid off the match at the 
end of the probation period.
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Proof of Proposition 1
To establish the result in Proposition 7 we make use of (3.10) and subtract the 
two equilibrium conditions (i.e. when both productivity groups destroy at T ) to 
obtain:
[1 _  e-(’-+<5)T] [ ( 1  _  p)z ?— ±  -  /3pic(8h -  0 *)]-
a
(B14) +(r + 5)P,C[^ ) ~ ^ ) 1=0
Now note that when T  tends to infinity, (B14) refers to the “no tax” case. As 
T  increases from 0 to oo, the l.h.s. of (B14) increases as well. Since the l.h.s. is 
decreasing in (6h — 6l) it is true that (9h — 6l) increases as T  rises, for any decreasing 
choice of q(-). Since the wage differential (Aw) is increasing in (6h — 6l) it follows 
that Aw  rises as T  rises. Given that the wage of high productivity insiders will have 
a firing tax component while the low productivity outsiders will not be protected 
by such regulations, Aw  is amplified when T  is finite and F  € (Fl, F h).
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Table 3.1 ( Source is OECD Employment Outlook 1999) 
E P L  ra n k in g s
Regular employment Temporary employment Overall EPL  strictness
Late 1980s Late 1990s Late 1980s Late 1990s Late 1980s Late 1990s
Austria 2 .6 2 .6 1 .8 1 .8 2 .2 2 .2
Belgium 1.5 1.5 4.6 2 .8 3.1 2 .1
France 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.6 2.7 3.0
Germany 2.7 2 .8 3.8 2.3 3.2 2.5
Ireland 1 .6 1 .6 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.9
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 2.4 1 .2 2.7 2 .1
Switzerland 1 .2 1 .2 0.9 0.9 1 .0 1 .0
UK 0 . 8 0 . 8 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Greece 2.5 2.4 4.8 4.8 3.6 3.6
Italy 2 . 8 2 .8 5.4 3.8 4.1 3.3
Portugal 4.8 4.3 3.4 3.0 4.1 3.7
Spain 3.9 2 .6 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.1
Turkey — 2 .6 — 4.9 — 3.8
Denmark 1 .6 1 .6 2 .6 0.9 2 .1 1 .2
Finland 2.7 2 .1 1.9 1.9 2.3 2 .0
Norway 2.4 2.4 3.5 2 .8 3.0 2 .6
Sweden 2 .8 2 .8 4.1 1 .6 3.5 2 .2
Czech Rep. — 2 .8 — 0.5 — 1.7
Hungary — 2 .1 — 0 .6 — 1.4
Poland — 2 .2 — 1 .0 — 1 .6
Canada 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 0 .6 0 .6
Mexico — 2.3 — — — —
US 0 .2 0 .2 0.3 0.3 0 .2 0 .2
Australia 1 .0 1 .0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Japan 2.7 2.7 — 2 .1 — 2.4
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Table 3.2 (Source is OECD Employment Outlook 1999)
Panel A: Trial period (in months) Panel B: Regulation of Fixed-term contracts
Late 1980s Late 1990s Maximum cumulated
Austria 1 .0 1 .0 period allowed (in months)
Belgium 3.3 3.3 Late 1980s Late 1990s
France 1 .6 1 .6 Belgium 24.0 30.0
Germany 6 .0 6 .0 France 24.0 18.0
Ireland 1 2 .0 1 2 .0 Germany 18.0 24.0
Netherlands 2 .0 2 .0 Ireland 1 2 .0  1 2 .0
Switzerland 2 .0 2 .0 Italy 9.0 15.0
UK 24.0 24.0 Portugal 30.0 30.0
Greece 2 .0 3.0 Spain 36.0 36.0
Italy 0 .8 0 .8
Portugal 1 .0 2 .0
Spain 1.7 2.5
Denmark 1.5 —
Finland 4.0 4.0
Norway 1 .0 1 .0
Sweden 6 .0 6 .0
Canada 3.0 3.0
US — —
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Table 3.3
Estimation results
Dependent
variable T E T E T E T E
Adjusted R 2 0.17 0.14 0.37 0.40
Constant 5.19* 5.93** 4.93 3.65
(3.15) (3.18) (4.12) (4.27)
E P L _ R E 3.24** 2.67**
(1.34) (1 .2 1 )
DD 2.28** 2 .2 1 **
(1.05) (0.91)
UR 0.53* 0.61**
(0.31) (0.30)
LPGR -3.04** -3.08**
(1 .0 0 ) (0.97)
GDPGR 1 .1 1 * 1.23*
(0.78) (0.77)
Notes to Table 3.3: Sources are OECD Statistical Compendium 2003 and OECD Em­
ployment Outlook 1999.*(**) denotes stat. significance at 10% (5%) level. T E  is tempo­
rary employment as % of total dependent employment (average 1998-2002), E P L _ R E  is
166
employment protection legislation for regular employment (late 1990s), DD  denotes dif­
ficulty of dismissal (late 1990s), UR  is unemployment rate (average 1998-2002), LPGR  
denotes labour productivity % change (average 1998-2002) and GDPGR  is real GDP  
growth rate (average 1998-2002). The sample includes 24 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer­
land, Turkey, UK and US. For the multivariate regression, 23 observations were used 
since there were no data for LPGR  for Turkey.
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Table 3.4 
Simulation results
High productivity (pi=  1.5) Low productivity (p = 0.5)
T  =  10 (2.5 years)
F  = 0.520 F  =  0.626 F  = 0.732 F = 0.520 F = 0.626 F  = 0.732
F 1.138 0.656
u 7.92% 7.96% 8 .0 1 % 13.14% 13.32% 21.90%
JD R 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 14.52%
T  = 12 (3 years)
F = 0.522 F = 0.629 F  = 0.735 F = 0.522 F = 0.629 F  = 0.735
F 1.03 0.60
u 7.89% 7.93% 7.96% 13.00% 19.65% 19.65%
JD R 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 12.96% 12.96%
T  = 14 (3.5 years)
F  =  0.523 F  = 0.631 F = 0.738 F = 0.523 F  = 0.631 F = 0.738
F 0.967 0.565
u 7.87% 7.89% 7.92% 1 2 .8 8 % 18.06% 18.06%
JD R 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 8 .0 0 % 11.87% 11.87%
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Notes to Table 3.4: T  is measured in quarters. The values for F  axe based on 24, 29 
and 34 percent of seven months’ wages of average productivity (p = 1) that is agreed, 
when the temporary contract becomes permanent. The rest of the parameter values are: 
A = 0.65, S = 0.08, r = 0.01, c =  0.3, b — 0.349, — 0.5 and rj = 0.5. Numbers in
bold indicate equilibrium in regime 1
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Figure 3.4: Simulations 
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